Research topics :
It is widely thought that awareness of oneself exhibits certain semantic and epistemic peculiarities (as compared with awareness of things other than oneself). Our research attempts to describe and explain these peculiarities, by investigating the nature and interconnections among phenomenal consciousness, self-awareness, and self-reference. Our approach is primarily philosophical but attempts to incorporate ongoing developments in cognitive science, neuroscience, and linguistics. Some of the phenomena we have focused on include: mental indexicality and self-reference; bodily self-awareness; emotions and self-consciousness; the alleged self-referential character of phenomenal consciousness; the relationship between consciousness and self-consciousness; attitudes de re and de se; the role of phenomenal consciousness in grounding other mental phenomena; imagination, fiction, and the first-person perspective; the role of metacognitive feelings in monitoring and controlling one’s own mind; the nature of the self; and the nature of perceptual consciousness.
Top: Géraldine Carranante, Enrico Grosso,
François Recanati, Elisabeth Pacherie.
Bottom: Uriah Kriegel, Tricia Magalotti, Daria Vitasovic, Anna Giustina, Andrew Lee, Nathalie Evin.
Uriah Kriegel (DR CNRS, consciousness and intentionality), Head
Jerome Dokic (DE EHESS, metacognition)
Pierre Jacob (DR CNRS, consciousness and action)
Elisabeth Pacherie (DR CNRS, agency an the self)
Jérôme Pelletier (MCF Université Bretagne Occidentale, emotions, fiction, and the self)
Francois Recanati (DR CNRS, mental indexicality)
Frederique de Vignemont (DR CNRS, bodily self-awareness)
Alexandre Billon (MCF Université de Lille, pathologies of the self)
Takuya Niikawa (Chiba University, Japan)
Sean Power (Lecturer, Trinity College Dublin)
Eli Chudnoff (Associate Professor, University of Miami)
John Morrison (Assistant Professor, Columbia University)
Nick Stang (University of Toronto)
Daniel Wehinger (University of Innsbruck)
Géraldine Carranante (Perception and categorization, dir. U. Kriegel)
Aïda Elamrani-Raoult (consciousness and machine-brain interface, Dir. Uriah Kriegel)
Julie Fontaine (intuitions, direction en co-tutelle J. Dokic et C. Tiercelin)
Anna Giustina (theories of epistemic justification, dir. U. Kriegel)
Tricia Magalotti (emotion and rationality, dir. Uriah Kriegel)
Jacques Mégier (consciousness and self-reference, dir. J. Dokic)
Victor Pitron (bodily hallucination)
Enrico Grosso (Turin)
Andrew Lee (NYU)
Daria Vitasovic (University of Milan)
Vincent Isnard (narrativity in music)
- Initial Training Network : "Diaphora", Sven Rozenkrantz. French team: "Self" (PI: Elisabeth Pacherie).
- A Leverhulme International Network 'What's So Special about First-Person Thought?', Stephan Torre. Aberdeen, ConceptLab-Oslo, Institute Jean Nicod, Logos-Barcelona, University of Oxford, University of St. Andrews & Tufts. French team : PI François Recanati.
- Columbia PSL Collaborative Network: Perception (November 2016-August 2017)
- "Intentionality, Consciousness, and Naturalization": A New Directions in the Study of the Mind project (January 2016-December 2017)
Jacob, P. Forthcoming. "Does the claim that phenomenology overflows cognitive access rest on an illusion?" In M. Frauchiger (ed.), Themes from Putnam. Ontos.
Kriegel, U. Forthcoming. "Brentano's Dual-Framing Theory of Consciousness." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Giustina, A. and U. Kriegel. 2017. "Fact-Introspection, Thing-Introspection, and Inner Awareness." Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8.
Giustina, A. 2017. "Conscious Unity from the Top Down." The Monist 100.
Billon, A. 2016. "Making Sense of Cotard Syndrome." Mind and Language 31: 356-391.
Dokic, J. 2016. "Aesthetic Experience as a Metacognitive Feeling? A Dual-Aspect View." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116: 69-88.
Billon, A. 2015. “Why are We Certain that We Exist?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91: 723-759.
Billon, A. and U. Kriegel 2015. “Jaspers’ Dilemma: The Psychopathological Challenge for Subjectivity Theories of Consciousness.” In R. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed Consciousness. MIT Press.
De Vignemont, F. 2015. “Pain and bodily care: Whose body matters?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93: 542-560.
Kriegel, U. 2015. The Varieties of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
Pacherie, E. 2014. "How Does It Feel to Act Together?" Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13: 25-46.
Pelletier, J. 2014 « Pour une neuroesthétique cognitive ». In J. Morizot (ed.), Naturaliser l’Esthétique ? PUR.
Recanati, F. 2014 "First Person Thought." In J. Dutant, D. Fassio and A. Meylan (eds.), Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel, University of Geneva, pp. 506-511.
De Vignemont, F. 2014. “A multimodal conception of bodily experiences.” Mind 123: 989-1020.
De Vignemont, F. 2013. "The mark of bodily ownership." Analysis 73: 643-651