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Thesis defense - Sandra LASRY - Human joint action ontogeny : How does the progression of mindreading and perspective-taking abilities shape capacities for joint action ?

 

 

The thesis defense will take place on Monday 18th January 2021 at 10am by videoconference.

Link to attend the defense : https://global.gotomeeting.com/join/380117717

The jury is made up of the following members :

Frédérique, de VIGNEMONT (Directrice de Recherche CNRS, ENS, PSL)
Cédric, PATERNOTTE (Maître de conférence, Sorbonne Université)
Steve, BUTTERFILL (Professor, University of Warwick)
Victoria, SOUTHGATE (Professor, University of Copenhagen) 
Cordula, VESPER (Associate Professor, Aarhus University) 
Elisabeth, PACHERIE (Directrice de Recherche CNRS, ENS, PSL)

Title of the defense : Human joint action ontogeny : How does the progression of mindreading and perspective-taking abilities shape capacities for joint action ?

Abstract : 

Many significant achievements of our species are the result of joint actions. Joint action requires co-agents to form shared representations of their environment, their goals and actions ; to do so, they integrate self and other representations within a unitary representation. I propose to investigate how a capacity for joint action and shared representations develops in human ontogeny. In philosophy, maximalists argue that joint action requires co-agents to share intentions (using theory of mind capacities) when minimalists contend that it requires only that individuals share goals (understanding others‘ behaviors as goal-directed). I defend a minimalist account considering that different forms of joint actions make different representational and sharing demands. In developmental psychology, early theory of mind abilities remain debated. I discuss the implications of this debate for young children‘s capacities to engage in joint action, concluding that young children may meet representational and sharing demands of minimal joint actions using goal representations and visual perspective-taking capacities (instead of intentions and theory of mind capacities). I offer a joint action matrix combining : (1) the type of representation involved in joint action based on its complexity and (2) the level of sharedness implied by such representations based on the co-agents‘ strategy to maximize the joint performance. I argue that, before young children fully develop the mindreading and perspective-taking abilities required for more complex joint actions, they may already successfully engage in minimal forms of joint action – imposing less representational and sharing demands.


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