January 15 : reading and discussion of Brendon Gillon,
"Implicit complements : a dilemma for model-theretic semantics"
The meetings take place on Tuesdays, from 12:00 to 14:00 in the salle de réunion, 29 rue d’Ulm, Pavillon Jardin
December 11, 2012 : Emanuel Viebahn (visitor from Oxford University) ; "Speaker Intentions and Semantic Content"
Abstract :
This talk will deal with the role of speaker intentions in semantic theories. It is widely held that the semantic content in context of many indexicals (e.g. of demonstratives and gradable adjectives) is determined by the speaker’s intentions. I (...)
Tuesday, December 4 at 16.30 - Salle de réunion, Pavillon Jardin, ENS, 29, rue d’Ulm 75005.
Alexandre Billon (IJN visitor from Lille University)
"The Present Problem Problem"
Abstract :
We know that our time is present. We are actually certain of that. What might be less obvious is how we can have such a knowledge. Some philosophers have indeed argued that this question is problematic and that it could not be answered unless we embrace presentism or the Block view. I argue (...)
Mardi 13 Novembre 16h30, salle de réunion IJN, Pavillon Jardin 29, rue d’Ulm 75005 Paris
ABSTRACT :
Philosophers have long noticed that there is a tight connection between conscious attention and the way we understand, verify, and come to know propositions containing demonstrative expressions. If I point to an apple on the ground and say ‘this is red and round’, in order to understand my utterance you need to know which object I am referring to, something you can do by allocating your (...)
Matias Gariazzo, PETAF visiting student from the University of London :
"Truth relativism about epistemic modals and the argument from ignorant assessors"
Tuesday, October 16, at 16.30 in the salle de reunion.
ABSTRACT :
The data on rejection and retraction that has been appealed to for
supporting truth relativism about epistemic modals involve (i) a
better-informed subject that assesses a claim made by a less informed
subject and (ii) a retraction made by the (...)
Mark Richard (Harvard) : Reference to rabbits
ABSTRACT :
There seems to be a quick argument for the conclusion that what we
refer to with practically all of our names and nouns is indeterminate.
The major premise is that names like ‘Peter Rabbit’ and predicates
like ‘rabbit’ are vague since there are a host of different
collections of molecules such that it is utterly indeterminate which
of those collections collects all and only the molecules that are part
of (...)