Institut Jean Nicod

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Présentation

 

 

Paris Consciousness/Self-consciousness [PaCS] group


2017-2018

 

Institut Jean-Nicod, Pavillon Jardin, ENS 29 rue d’Ulm, 75005. Salle de réunion.

Contact : Uriah Kriegel

 

 

 

28 mai, 16-18h : Laurie Paul (UNC), "Reverse-engineering the Self"


ABSTRACT
A truly intelligent machine needs to be an intelligent agent in order to successfully think, perceive and act in a human world. We identify some key features of intelligent agency in functional terms, and use these features to explore ideas about how to reverse engineer the core (functional) structure needed for humanlike, intelligent agency, that is, how to reverse engineer the grounding structure of a humanlike self. Our approach brings together the "standard model" of an intelligent agent that is at the heart of both modern AI and leading computational models of human cognition with contemporary philosophical work on selves, intentional agency, indexicality, and the de se.
(Work done in collaboration with Tomer Ullman and Josh Tenenbaum.)

 

31 mai, 16h-18h : Benjamin Kozuch (University of Alabama), "Higher-order states are not necessary for consciousness — so say the neuroscientific data"

 

7 juin, 16-18h : Géraldine Carranante, "Grounding Pluralism: Metaphysical foundations of the perception/cognition border(s)"
 

ABSTRACT
Pluralism with respect to the boundary between the class of perceptual states and the class of cognitive states has recently been defended by some philosophers (Beck, 2017; Phillips, 2017). Contrary to traditional Monism (’there is a unique border between perception and cognition’) and Eliminativism (’there is no border at all’), pluralism defends the idea that there are several equally good distinctions to draw between perception and cognition. This kind of classificatory pluralism is not new in other scientific domains, such as biology, and has already met with
resistance. In this talk, I will explore these different worries concerning pluralism. I will argue then (1) that the resistance to pluralism is due to a lack of good metaphysical grounding and (2) that Promiscuous Realism (Dupré, 1981) is a good metaphysical position to ground adequately pluralism with respect to mental classification.

 

14 juin, 16-18h : Claudia Passos-Ferreira (NYU), "Varieties of Phenomenology in Infants"

 

Past sessions

6 novembre, 16-18h: Antonin BROI (Sorbonne), "Revelation and Phenomenal Relations"

ABSTRACT
It is usually accepted that low-level sensory phenomenal properties, like phenomenal red, loudness, or brightness, stand in relation of similarity and quantity. Furthermore, these similarity and quantitative relations are taken to be internal, that is, to supervene on their relata. I show that this leads to a difficult position for the many philosophers who endorse Revelation, the claim that we are presented with the essence of phenomenal properties.


16 novembre, 16-18h : Takuya NIIKAWA, "Radical Naive Realism"

 

7 decembre, 16-18h : Tobias Schlicht (Bochum), "On the Search for the Neural Correlates of Consciousness"

ABSTRACT
Many philosophers and scientists think that explaining consciousness is an empirical problem left for neuroscientists rather than philosophers. This paper demonstrates the limitations of the primary research program in cognitive neuroscience: finding the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) as the minimal set of brain processes sufficient for a particular percept. The main claim is that it is doubtful that the right kind of correlations will ever be obtained because the foregoing conceptual decisions regarding the relations between consciousness, attention, report, and other cognitive functions will determine the interpretation of the correlation data that can be obtained. This problem is illustrated by formulating a dilemma: If researchers rely on subjective reports then the NCC will most likely be confounded with the neural mechanism for cognitive functions because reports presuppose cognitive access. But if researchers bypass reports and rely on other objective behavioral data such as automatic eye reflexes, then the NCC will most likely be confounded with neural mechanisms underlying unconscious processes. So there does not seem to be a way of making sure to have isolated the neural correlate of conscious experience.

 

11 décembre, 16-18h: Enrico Terrone (Torino/IJN), "How We See Things in Pictures: An Attitudinal Approach to Seeing-in"

ABSTRACT
According to Richard Wollheim, in looking at a picture we enjoy not only a perceptual experience of the picture’s surface but also a perceptual experience of the things depicted. Yet, as pointed out by Malcom Budd and Robert Hopkins, Wollheim only provides a negative account of the latter experience. Wollheim argues that this experience is not a form of standard visual representation, but he does not specifies what makes this experience, as such, special. I will exploit Franz Brentano’s distinction between the content and the attitude of a mental state in order to propose a positive account of how we see things in pictures. I will argue that the specificity of the perceptual experience of the things depicted lies in the attitude of this experience.

 

11 janvier, 16-18h: Raphaël KÜNSTLER (Toulouse/IJN), "Introspective Social Knowledge"

ABSTRACT
Philosophers of social sciences disagree whether interpretation is a legitimate method in social inquiries. Can the naturalization of epistemology settle this dispute? If social sciences rely on interpretive methods, the naturalization of social sciences depends on the naturalization of hermeneutics. According to Mantzavinos (2015), it is possible to use the findings of cognitive psychology in order to accomplish such naturalization. Following this lead, Alvin Goldman’s simulationism is an apt framework to analyze the production of social knowledge. However, the simulationist prediction of the reliability of interpretative processes relies on the assumption that there is a certain familiarity between the inquirer and its target. Such assumption is not legitimate in most social inquiries. Therefore, simulationism entails that the interpretivist method should be abandoned. Is there a way to avoid such drastic conclusion? What part of the simulationist machinery should be changed in order to avoid skepticism? The simulationist model of interpretation crucially involves introspective and meta-representational processes. I claim that if introspection is conceived as an inquiry, and not only as a direct access to one’s state of mind, the project of a naturalistic foundation of interpretative social knowledge can be saved.

 

29 janvier, 16-18h: Tricia Magalotti (IJN), "A Consequentialist Account of Evidential Fit"

ABSTRACT
Process reliabilism about epistemic justification states that a subject’s belief that p is justified iff it was formed using a process that reliably produces true beliefs. Evidentialism about epistemic justification (or a version of it) states that whether a subject was justified in believing p depends on whether that subject formed the belief on the basis of evidence that supports p. Both reliabilism and evidentialism capture certain intuitive features of epistemic justification. For this reason, several epistemologists have been motivated to adopt hybrid versions of evidentialism and reliabilism. This talk will present a novel hybrid view of evidentialism and reliabilism. I will argue that this view improves in certain ways upon existing views in the literature and, specifically, upon Comesaña’s Evidentialist Reliabilism.

 

5 février, 16-18h : Andrew Lee (NYU), "First-Personal Technology"

ABSTRACT
First-personal technology is technology that enhances first-personal investigation of experience. This talk will provide a philosophical analysis of first-personal technology. I’ll discuss how we could develop first-personal technology to control and observe experiences, just as we have developed third-personal technology to control and observe the physical world. I’ll consider nascent examples of first-personal technologies, address the philosophical challenges that arise in developing and employing such technology, and discuss why first-personal technology could transform the science of consciousness.

 

8 février, 16-18h : Uriah Kriegel (IJN), "Introspective Awareness, Introspective Acquaintance, Introspective Revelation, and Introspective Insight"

ABSTRACT
In this talk, I distinguish four putative introspective phenomena of interest and formulate nine theses of interest about them. The weakest of these theses is that introspective awareness exists. The strongest is that introspective insight is indispensable for philosophical understanding of the world.

 

30 avril, 16h-18h : Benjamin Kozuch (University of Alabama), “A paucity of HOTs: Evaluating the neuroscientific evidence for higher-order theories of consciousness"

ABSTRACT
Higher-order theories of consciousness hypothesize perceptual states to be conscious when and only when they are represented by another mental state. Some higher-order theorists have recently appealed to neuroscientific data to support this theory, especially lesion evidence. This talk first investigates the question of what kinds of deficit of consciousness should result when a brain area that produces higher-order states is impaired, then argues that the lesion evidence to which higher-order theorists appeal fails to meet these predictions.

 

3 mai, 16h-18h : Sebastian Watzl (Oslo), "The Perception-Desire Distinction"

 

14 mai, 16-18h : François Kammerer (IJN), "Pain, pleasure and value in a world without consciousness"

ABSTRACT
Many people think that phenomenal states (and more particularly ​valenced phenomenal states, such as pain and pleasure) ground some important kind of value. For example, they think that our lives are valuable only because we are phenomenally conscious: were we to become phenomenal zombies, our lives would lose most, if not all of their value. They may also think that the instantiation of ​valenced ​phenomenal states, such as phenomenal pleasure or phenomenal pain, has some kind of intrinsic value (positive or negative), which is such that creatures able to enter these states (sentient creatures) hence possess some ​specific rights.​ ​
Such claims linking phenomenality to value are quite common, and maybe also quite intuitive. One may therefore wonder: what happens to the value of our lives, or to the rights of sentient creatures, if eliminativism regarding phenomenal consciousness is true – if there are no phenomenal states? I will try to answer this question.

 
 

EHESSCNRSENS