Institut Jean Nicod

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Présentation

 

 

Paris Consciousness/Self-consciousness [PaCS] group


2017-2018

 

Institut Jean-Nicod, Pavillon Jardin, ENS 29 rue d’Ulm, 75005. Salle de réunion.

Contact : Uriah Kriegel

 

 

 

11 janvier, 16-18h: Raphaël KÜNSTLER (Toulouse/IJN), "Introspective Social Knowledge"

29 janvier, 16-18h: Tricia Magalotti (IJN), "The Epistemic Peculiarity of Emotions"

5 février, 16-18h : Andrew Lee (NYU), "First-Personal Technology"

8 février, 16-18h : Uriah Kriegel (IJN), "Introspective Acquaintance"

30 avril, 16-18h : Géraldine Carranante (IJN), "Perception and Function"

14 mai, 16-18h : François Kammerer (IJN), "Pain, pleasure and value in a world without consciousness"

28 mai, 16-18h : Laurie Paul (UNC), "Reverse-engineering the Self"

 

Past sessions

6 novembre, 16-18h: Antonin BROI (Sorbonne), "Revelation and Phenomenal Relations"

ABSTRACT
It is usually accepted that low-level sensory phenomenal properties, like phenomenal red, loudness, or brightness, stand in relation of similarity and quantity. Furthermore, these similarity and quantitative relations are taken to be internal, that is, to supervene on their relata. I show that this leads to a difficult position for the many philosophers who endorse Revelation, the claim that we are presented with the essence of phenomenal properties.


16 novembre, 16-18h : Takuya NIIKAWA, "Radical Naive Realism"

 

7 decembre, 16-18h : Tobias Schlicht (Bochum), "On the Search for the Neural Correlates of Consciousness"

ABSTRACT
Many philosophers and scientists think that explaining consciousness is an empirical problem left for neuroscientists rather than philosophers. This paper demonstrates the limitations of the primary research program in cognitive neuroscience: finding the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) as the minimal set of brain processes sufficient for a particular percept. The main claim is that it is doubtful that the right kind of correlations will ever be obtained because the foregoing conceptual decisions regarding the relations between consciousness, attention, report, and other cognitive functions will determine the interpretation of the correlation data that can be obtained. This problem is illustrated by formulating a dilemma: If researchers rely on subjective reports then the NCC will most likely be confounded with the neural mechanism for cognitive functions because reports presuppose cognitive access. But if researchers bypass reports and rely on other objective behavioral data such as automatic eye reflexes, then the NCC will most likely be confounded with neural mechanisms underlying unconscious processes. So there does not seem to be a way of making sure to have isolated the neural correlate of conscious experience.

 

11 décembre, 16-18h: Enrico Terrone (Torino/IJN), "How We See Things in Pictures: An Attitudinal Approach to Seeing-in"

ABSTRACT
According to Richard Wollheim, in looking at a picture we enjoy not only a perceptual experience of the picture’s surface but also a perceptual experience of the things depicted. Yet, as pointed out by Malcom Budd and Robert Hopkins, Wollheim only provides a negative account of the latter experience. Wollheim argues that this experience is not a form of standard visual representation, but he does not specifies what makes this experience, as such, special. I will exploit Franz Brentano’s distinction between the content and the attitude of a mental state in order to propose a positive account of how we see things in pictures. I will argue that the specificity of the perceptual experience of the things depicted lies in the attitude of this experience.

 

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