Vendredi 30 septembre 2016 de 11h30 à 13h
Institut Jean-Nicod, Pavillon Jardin, ENS, 29, rue d'Ulm 75005. Salle de réunion, RDC
"Cognitive Phenomenology, Metacognitive Feelings, and the Introspective Super-Blindsight Metaphor".
One of the most controversial debates in the contemporary Philosophy of Mind centers on the discussion of whether cognitive attitudes have a proprietary phenomenology. The cognitive phenomenology thesis claims that “there is something it is like” to have cognitive states; mental states such as believing, desiring, hoping, attending, and so on, have a particular phenomenology that subjects can introspect. This thesis has been sometimes associated to metacognitive feelings, after Goldman’s claim that the Tip-of-the-Tongue phenomenon is a instance of cognitive phenomenology. This paper reviews the controversy about the cognitive phenomenology, and assess Goldman’s proposal in order to determine whether metacognitive feelings actually constitute an instance of cognitive phenomenology. The paper will show that psychological data cast doubt on the idea that metacognitive feelings are instances of cognitive phenomenology. So, the paper concludes that philosophical and psychological theories of metacognitive feelings can account for metacognitive feelings without invoking any cognitive phenomenology properly speaking, and philosophers willing to promote the cognitive phenomenology thesis should not count metacognitive feelings as evidence for for their thesis. In order to better understand the role of metacognitive feelings, the last section develops the metaphor of the introspective super-blindsight.