Institut Jean Nicod

Accueil du site > Séminaires & Colloques > Doc’in Nicod > Doc’in Nicod

Doc’in Nicod




Séminaire doctoral et postdoctoral de l’Institut Jean-Nicod.

Doctoral and post-doctoral seminar of the IJN.

Doc’in Nicod is a biweekly seminar providing an opportunity for young researchers, doctoral students and post-doctoral fellows from the IJN to receive feedback on work in progress from fellow graduate students and researchers of the Institute. Each session will feature one researcher of the IJN as a commentator.

The seminar is open to the public.

Talks will be held at the Institut Jean Nicod, ENS, 29 rue d’Ulm, 75005 Paris. Conference room of the Pavillon Jardin. 

Contact : Armando Lavalle or Hualin Xiao





To be postponed until further notice

Friday, December 6, 2019, 4:00 - 5:30 pm
Matheus Valente (PhD student University of Barcelona / Visiting IJN)
Commentator : Gregory Bochner

Why cannot my I be your You ?

Abstract :
Many seem to think that indexical thoughts are particularly hard to share or to communicate. The reasoning behind that impression often boils down to the claim that one’s self-thoughts cannot be identical to another’s you-thoughts - since the first is de se, the second, de te. This is particularly disappointing since, in suitable contexts, I-thoughts and you-thoughts can be witnesses to successful communications. Analogously, there is a sense according to which, in suitable contexts, for you to believe just what I believe by uttering a first-personal utterance is for you to assent to what, in your mouth, would be a second-personal utterance. It would thus be very desirable if, sometimes, I-thoughts and you-thoughts could be identified. In this talk I intend to confront several arguments against that possibility. The arguments include considerations about action motivation, cognitive value and the Lewisian relativistic framework of propositional attitudes.




Session 1

Friday, November 29, 2019, 4:00 - 5:30 pm
Elmarie Venter (PhD student Ruhr University Bochum / Visiting IJN)
Commentator : Jérôme Dokic

The Perceiving Agent

Abstract :
In this talk, I investigate Recanati’s interpretation of Searle’s account of intentionality. On this interpretation, the satisfaction conditions of an intentional state are twofold : the primary condition and the self-referential condition. Searle claims that both of these conditions are determined by the content of an intentional state. This takes the form of a conjunctive proposition determined by the state of the world perceived and the experience of which this state is the content (Recanati 2006 : 4). I uphold Recanati’s claim that the content of an intentional state only captures the primary condition, and that the self-referential condition is determined by the mode of the intentional state. What remains desired however is an account of the subject, and her role in the intentional state. I draw three distinctions that give us useful parameters for an account of self- representation :

  1. The subject/object distinction. We need to understand the different ways in which an agent enters an intentional state. What does this mean for how we represent ourselves, and generate self-models ?
  2. The implicit/explicit distinction. We need to understand the role of the subject in representing the world. Is represented content selfless, or does the subject form part of what is explicitly represented ?
  3. The IEM/non-IEM distinction. We need to understand the conditions under which judgements can be immune to error through misidentification, and how this relates to the previous two distinctions.