Institut Jean Nicod

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Doc’in Nicod

 

2019-2020

 

Séminaire doctoral et postdoctoral de l’Institut Jean-Nicod.

Doctoral and post-doctoral seminar of the IJN.

Doc’in Nicod is a biweekly seminar providing an opportunity for young researchers, doctoral students and post-doctoral fellows from the IJN to receive feedback on work in progress from fellow graduate students and researchers of the Institute. Each session will feature one researcher of the IJN as a commentator.

The seminar is open to the public.

Talks will be held at the Institut Jean Nicod, ENS, 29 rue d’Ulm, 75005 Paris. Conference room of the Pavillon Jardin. 

Contact : Armando Lavalle or Hualin Xiao

 


 


 

Session 2 

Date : Friday, January 24, 2020, 4:00 - 5:30 pm
Speaker : Guido Löhr (PhD student IJN / RUB)
Commentator : Elisabeth Pacherie

Title : On commitments

Abstract :

Commitment accounts of assertion and promises are becoming more and more popular. But what exactly are commitments ? This question has not been fully discussed in the literature. This makes commitment accounts difficult to assess. In my talk, I will give an account of what commitments are. I will respond and reject previous analyses in the literature and in particular discuss Bart Geurts’ recent definition in detail.

 

 

 

 

 


PAST SESSIONS

 

Session 1

Friday, November 29, 2019, 4:00 - 5:30 pm
Elmarie Venter (PhD student Ruhr University Bochum / Visiting IJN)
Commentator : Jérôme Dokic

The Perceiving Agent

Abstract :
In this talk, I investigate Recanati’s interpretation of Searle’s account of intentionality. On this interpretation, the satisfaction conditions of an intentional state are twofold : the primary condition and the self-referential condition. Searle claims that both of these conditions are determined by the content of an intentional state. This takes the form of a conjunctive proposition determined by the state of the world perceived and the experience of which this state is the content (Recanati 2006 : 4). I uphold Recanati’s claim that the content of an intentional state only captures the primary condition, and that the self-referential condition is determined by the mode of the intentional state. What remains desired however is an account of the subject, and her role in the intentional state. I draw three distinctions that give us useful parameters for an account of self- representation :

  1. The subject/object distinction. We need to understand the different ways in which an agent enters an intentional state. What does this mean for how we represent ourselves, and generate self-models ?
  2. The implicit/explicit distinction. We need to understand the role of the subject in representing the world. Is represented content selfless, or does the subject form part of what is explicitly represented ?
  3. The IEM/non-IEM distinction. We need to understand the conditions under which judgements can be immune to error through misidentification, and how this relates to the previous two distinctions.

 

 

 

 

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