Institut Jean Nicod

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Colloquium de philosophie de Jean Nicod


L’Institut Jean Nicod est heureux de vous présenter les colloquium de cette année. Ci-dessous le calendrier des intervenants.

Lieu : Salle de réunion de l’Institut Jean Nicod

Nous aurons un nombre limité d’emplacements pour les participants externes. Si vous souhaitez assister à une session, merci d’envoyer un mail environ une semaine avant cette session à Denis Buehler.



 Prochaines conférences



Julie Jebeile (Berne)

Vendredi 11 février 2022 à 11h


Julia Langkau (Flensburg)

Vendredi 11 mars 2022 à 11h


Mona Simion (Glasgow)

Vendredi 22 avril 2022 à 11h


Miranda Fricker (CUNY)

Vendredi 20 mai 2022 à 11h


Michael Rescorla (UCLA)

Vendredi 10 juin 2022 à 11h



Conférences passées



Myrto Mylopoulos (Carleton)

"Agency as a Marker of Consciousness in the Gray Zone"

Vendredi 10 décembre 2021 à 11h

Studies of consciousness often treat verbal report as the “gold standard” for attributions of conscious mental states to another individual. But there are cases where this strategy is not available, for instance, in non-human animals and infants. In response, some have suggested that non-verbal behaviour, i.e., certain forms of agency, can be used as evidence of conscious awareness in such cases (e.g., Bayne 2012).

In this talk, I propose to explore the viability of such a view in the context of patients that have been diagnosed as having unresponsiveness wakefulness syndrome (UWS), and who exhibit no overt purposive responses to their environment, but nonetheless retain the ability to covertly follow certain commands, as evidenced by neuroimaging techniques. I first confront a set of skeptical challenges in the literature, which aim to cast doubt on the claim that the covert responses these individuals produce amount to intentional actions. Next, I argue that though their responses are genuinely intentional, we still do not have strong reasons to suppose that the relevant mental states that enable these individuals to produce them are conscious states. I end by addressing a primary motivation for determining whether UWS individuals are consciously aware, which is an assumed link between consciousness and moral status. I argue that this link is weaker than it seems


Dustin Stokes (Utah)

"The malleability of the mind"

Vendredi 29 octobre 2021 à 11h

Orthodoxy in philosophy of perception and cognitive science still has it that perception is modular. Indeed, modularity is treated by its proponents and opponents as the default theory. This default position assumption, I argue, is supported neither by strong arguments nor by superior explanatory power. Once we give up the assumption, genuine alternative architectures of the mind can be proposed and defended on their own merits rather than as counterexamples to the default. The alternative I defend is the malleability of the mind. Thinking not only affects perception, thinking improves perception. These broad claims are defended by appeal to a wide range of empirical research on perceptual expertise.


LA Paul (Yale)

“The intuitive theory of the self”

Vendredi 15 octobre 2021 à 11h

I explore the philosophical issues that arise when we explore the metaphysical structure of experience and the first personal self, especially with respect to causal and temporal experience.


Nirmalangshu Mukherjee (University of Delhi, India)

"Sound of Thoughts"

Vendredi 7 mai 2021 à 11h

All work on language assume a certain basic design feature of language : there is a thought part and there is a sensorimotor part. Human languages are distinguished in that these two parts are somehow put together. The task of a theory of language thus is to suggest explanatory models in which this design feature is predicted for each construction in each human language. This design feature has also motivated some researchers, such as Chomsky and Berwick (2016), to propose a ‘divide and rule’ policy : language basically concerns (structuring of) thought, sound is ‘ancillary’.

We develop some preliminary considerations to suggest that the Chomsky-Berwick proposal is radically false. We develop two related arguments. First, we show that thoughts involving singular terms are necessarily connected with sound. Hence, the description of human thought remains incomplete without sound-meaning correlation. Second, more fundamentally, we challenged the idea that there could be thought without antecedent sound/gesture. Sound/gesture gives the ‘body’ to thought ; sound/gesture enables thought to come to being, so to speak. If time permits, a range of consequences will be sketched.


Christopher Peacocke (Columbia)

"Philosophical and Empirical Aspects of Music Perception"

Vendredi 14 mai 2021 de 11h à 13h

This talk will address the question of what it is for music to possess emotional and other psychological content ; and what it is not. It will discuss the relations of the approach suggested to other recent theories (Robinson, Schlenker). More generally, it will address the relations between constitutive philosophical theories on the one hand and both scientific and historical issues on the other. It will consider the relation of a constitutive account to autism and musical understanding ; to the visual perception by the audience of musical performers ; and to the structure of underlying representations involved in music perception in the mind-brain. Time permitting, it will also discuss the contributions constitutive philosophical accounts can make to the characterization of musical styles.


David Velleman (NYU)

"The two normativities"

Vendredi 12 mars 2021 de 19h à 21h

Two kinds of normativity have been identified by moral philosophers. One is the normativity of action- or attitude-guiding language ; the other is the normativity of reasons for actions or attitudes. I am going to argue that the normativity of language and the normativity of reasons have much less to do with each other than is generally supposed. My suggestion is that Hume’s argument about ‘is’ and ‘ought’, which is an argument about language, has very little to do with his argument about reason and the passions, which is an argument about reasons.


Ian Philips (Johns Hopkins University)

"Are We All Animals"

Vendredi 12 février 2021 de 19h à 21h

Animalism is standardly articulated as the thesis that we are animals. So understood, cases of dicephalus conjoined twins are widely regarded as posing a serious challenge to the view. For such twins would appear to be numerically distinct individuals associated with a single animal (e.g., Campbell and McMahan 2016). In reply, animalists have claimed either that such twins are two animals (e.g., Liao 2006, Snowdon 2014), or that they are not numerically distinct (e.g., Olson 2014, Boyle 2020). Both approaches face serious objections. This motivates a neglected response on which whilst “we” (in a sense to be made precise) are animals, dicephalus conjoined twins are not. Supposing that each twin is instead a distinct proper part of an animal, this proposal quickly encounters an especially severe version of the “thinking parts” objection to animalism. For if the twins are thinking parts of animals, what prevents “our” having proper parts which think in their own right (Olson 2014). By combining Madden’s (2016) reply to the traditional “thinking parts” objection with a more sophisticated, pluralist account of function, I show how this objection can be defused. What emerges is a principled basis for holding that, quite consistent with animalism, dicephalus conjoined twins are a real-world example of non- animal persons. Time allowing, I’ll draw one striking consequence of this view, and explore whether it applies in any other clinical cases.


Gabriel Greenberg (UCLA) "The Iconic-Symbolic Spectrum"

Vendredi 9 octobre 2020

Victoria McGeer (Princeton/ANU) "Empathy internalized"

Vendredi 13 novembre 2020

Pepa Toribio (ICREA-UB) "Biases and Vices"

Vendredi 11 décembre 2020