Presentation

One day workshop in Moral Psychology

March, 19th
 

Institut Jean Nicod, ENS, Pavillon Jardin, 29, rue d'Ulm 75005 Paris. Salle de réunion, RDC.

Morning: Metaethics

10-11:30 Uriah Kriegel (CNRS, IJN),
"Dual-Process Cognitivist Internalism"

Abstract:
The organizing problem of contemporary moral psychology emanates from the apparent tension between the inherently motivational role of moral judgments and their manifestly objectivistic phenomenology. I argue that dual-process accounts of moral judgment provide us with the resources to (dis)solve this problem. I call the emerging view of moral judgment dual-process cognitivist internalism. I close with remarks on how the view illuminates a first-order moral conundrum: why is it hard to do the right thing?

11:30-13 Stéphane Lemaire (Université Rennes 1, IJN),
"A practical criterion for the FAA of affective values"

Abstract:
On fitting attitude analyses of values, an object is, say, admirable if and only if admiration fits the object. These analyses of value face the wrong kind of reasons problem insofar as one may have reason to admire an object and hence reason to see admiration as fitting although the object is not admirable. All existing attempts to overcome the problem take it that prudential and moral reasons are irrelevant to the the relevant notion of fittingness. However, I suggest that if we focus on affective value concepts such as admirable, fearsome or despicable, this is a premature judgment for several reasons. In any case, the paper provides and justifies an analysis of these concepts that is largely in terms of practical reasons. In addition, I offer and motivate a criterion that identifies the right kind of reasons. I eventually show that the resulting analysis has paradoxical consequences that a friend of FAA of values might have wished to avoid.

Key words :
Value, reason, emotion, affective value, fittingness, Fitting attitude, fitting attitude analysis, wrong kind of reason problem.

13-14:30 Lunch


Afternoon: Moral Psychology

14:30-16 Tiziana Zalla (CNRS, IJN),
"Using moral information in social interaction in people with autism spectrum disorders"

16-17:30 Nicolas Baumard (IJN),
 "Why is there morality in the universe? An evolutionary approach"

Abstract:
What makes humans moral beings? This question can be understood either as a proximate “how” question or as an ultimate “why” question. The “how” question is about the mental and social mechanisms that produce moral judgments and interactions, and has been investigated by psychologists and social scientists. The “why” question is about the fitness consequences that explain why humans have morality, and has been discussed by evolutionary biologists in the context of the evolution of cooperation. My goal here is to contribute to a fruitful articulation of such proximate and ultimate explanations of human morality. I will present an approach to morality as an adaptation to an environment in which individuals were in competition to be chosen and recruited in mutually advantageous cooperative interactions. In this environment, the best strategy is to treat others with impartiality and to share the costs and benefits of cooperation equally. Those who offer less than others will be left out of cooperation; conversely, those who offer more will be exploited by their partners. In line with the idea, a range of experiments demonstrate that moral judgments aim at keeping social interactions mutually advantageous.