PhD student at the École Normale Supérieure and at the Institut Jean Nicod, financed by PSL Research University.
Advisor: Uriah Kriegel.
Research subject: Theories of epistemic justification.
My research project connects epistemology to philosophy of mind. It aims at defending a version of foundationalism about epistemic justification.
On the version of foundationalism I want to defend, foundational beliefs are phenomenal beliefs, that is, beliefs about the phenomenal properties of conscious experience. In order to defend this version of foundationalism I need to show that (i) phenomenal beliefs are justified, (ii) the justification of phenomenal beliefs does not depend on any other empirical belief’s justification, and (iii) the justification of all other beliefs, ultimately depends on phenomenal beliefs.
My analysis of the formation of phenomenal beliefs will be grounded in a study of phenomenal concepts. Part of my argumentation will take advantage of the conceptual tools I explored in my MA thesis, i.e. the distinction I draw between two kinds of introspection: thing-introspection and fact-introspection.
‘Phenomenal Knowledge, Introspection, and Inner Awareness’, forthcoming in Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2016). (With Uriah Kriegel).
‘Conscious Unity from the Top Down: A Brentanian Approach’, forthcoming in The Monist. 100 (2017).
CURRICULUM VITAE: click here.