Institut Jean Nicod

Accueil > Membres > Archives > 2020-2021 > GIUSTINA Anna > GIUSTINA Anna




I did my PhD at the Institut Jean Nicod (École Normale Supérieure), working mainly in the areas of philosophy of mind and epistemology under the supervision of Uriah Kriegel.

My dissertation defense took place on December 17th, 2018 and the jury was composed by Dorothea Debus (University of York), Uriah Kriegel (Institut Jean Nicod), François Récanati (Institut Jean Nicod), Susanna Schellenberg (Rutgers University), and Charles Siewert (Rice University).



I work mainly on consciousness, introspection and self-knowledge. My current research focuses on introspection of phenomenal states, that is, the distinctively first-personal method through which one can get knowledge of the phenomenology of one’s current conscious experience. Particularly, I am interested in the nature and epistemology of what I call primitive introspection. Primitive introspection is a non-classificatory kind of phenomenal-state introspection, where by non-classificatory I mean not involving recognizing the introspected phenomenal state as an instance of any experience type.

In my dissertation, I defend three main claims about primitive introspection. First, itexists : there is a mental phenomenon that has the features I attribute to primitive introspection and such a phenomenon is a full-fledged introspective process. Second, its natureis best accounted for by a version of the acquaintancetheory (I call my own version of the acquaintance view the integration account). Third, it has adistinct epistemic value : it provides the subject with knowledge of their phenomenal states. Such knowledge is a sui generiskind of knowledge : knowledge by acquaintance, which is full-fledged knowledge, although it is irreducible to propositional knowledge. Moreover, not only primitive introspection is epistemically significant : it is also epistemically special. It provides the subject with what I call a complete and perfect graspof the phenomenology of one’s current conscious experience.

Here are some of the ideas I plan to develop in near-future research :

1. Primitive introspection as a necessary (although not sufficient) groundfor the acquisition and improvement of self-knowledge ;

2. The role of the notion of primitive introspection in assessing skepticismabout introspection ;

3. The relationship between primitive introspection and pre-reflective (peripheral) inner awareness ;

4. The moral or practical valueof primitive introspection ;

5. The relationship between primitive introspection and the metaphysics, phenomenology, and epistemology of the self.



Introspection without Judgment’, Erkenntnis(forthcoming).

Phenomenal Knowledge, Introspection, and Inner Awareness’,Review of Philosophy and Psychology8 (2017). (With Uriah Kriegel).

Conscious Unity from the Top Down : A Brentanian Approach’,The Monist. 100 (2017).

‘Varieties of Non-Reflective Self-Apprehension’, in Marc Borner, Manfred Frank, and Kenneth Williford (eds.),Senses of Self. Approaches to Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness(forthcoming).