How Language Enters Perception
John Campbell

Mardi 26 septembre de 15h00 à 17h00
Space and Language
École normale supérieure, Salle Dussane
45, rue d'Ulm, 75005 Paris

Remise du Prix Jean-Nicod et cocktail après la conférence.

Jeudi 28 septembre de 15h00 à 17h00
Time
École normale supérieure, Salle Dussane
45, rue d'Ulm, 75005 Paris

Mardi 3 octobre de 15h00 à 17h00
Tool Use
École normale supérieure, Salle Jaurès
29, rue d'Ulm, 75005 Paris

Jeudi 5 octobre de 15h00 à 17h00
Joint Attention
École normale supérieure, Salle Jaurès
29, rue d'Ulm, 75005 Paris

Organisation
Frédérique de Vignemont

Communication
Tassnim Lesguillons

Institut Jean-Nicod
École normale supérieure
Pavillon Jardin
29, rue d'Ulm
75005 Paris
Tél. : + 33 (1) 44 32 26 96
Fax. : + 33 (1) 44 32 26 99
http://www.institutnicod.org

philosophie cognitive

Conférences Jean-Nicod de

L'esprit humain, son organisation, sa nature, ses relations avec le corps et avec le monde sont depuis toujours parmi les thèmes centraux de la philosophie. La psychologie contemporaine elle-même a pris naissance au sein de la philosophie. Elle s'est émancipée, mais l'émergence des sciences cognitives consacre d'une certaine façon le retour de la philosophie dans ce champ de recherche. Les développements de l'informatique et des neurosciences, en jetant une nouvelle lumière sur les phénomènes mentaux, ont eu pour effet de relancer le débat philosophique. La « philosophie de l'esprit » est ainsi plus florissante que jamais. Ce retour n'a rien d'une régression, car la philosophie dont il est question est en phase avec la recherche scientifique, informée par elle et en constante interaction avec elle.

Les Conférences Jean-Nicod visent à promouvoir les recherches philosophiques se rapportant à la cognition et à faire connaître en France les travaux réalisés à l'étranger dans ce domaine. Le conférencier présente ses recherches au cours d'un cycle de conférences qu'il rassemble ensuite en un livre.

Conférenciers Jean-Nicod

Jerry Fodor (1993) ■ Fred Dretske (1994) ■ Donald Davidson (1995) ■ Hans Kamp (1996) ■ Jon Elster (1997) ■ Susan Carey (1998) ■ John Perry (1999) ■ John Searle (2000) ■ Daniel Dennett (2001) ■ Ruth Millikan (2002) ■ Ray Jackendoff (2003) ■ Zenon Pylyshyn (2004) ■ Gilbert Harman (2005) ■ Michael Tomasello (2006) ■ Stephen Stich (2007) ■ Kim Sterelny (2008) ■ Elizabeth S. Spelke (2009) ■ Tyler Burge (2010) ■ Gergely Csibra et György Gergely (2011) ■ Ned Block (2013) ■ Uta et Chris Frith (2014). ■ David Chalmers (2015) ■ Patrick Haggard (2016) ■

Collection Jean-Nicod

The MIT Press - F. Récanati (dir.)

J. Fodor, The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and its Semantics (1994) ■ F. Dretske, Naturalizing the Mind (1995) ■ J. Elster, Strong Feelings: Emotion, Addiction, and Human Behavior (1999) ■ J. Perry, Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness (2001) ■ J. Searle, Rationality in Action (2001) ■ R. G. Millikan, Varieties of Meaning (2004) ■ D. Dennett, Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness (2005) ■ G. Harman and S. Kulkarni, Reliable Reasoning: Induction and Statistical Learning Theory (2007) ■ R. Jackendoff, Language, Consciousness, Culture: Essays on Mental Structure (2007) ■ Z. W. Pylyshyn, Things and Places: How the Mind Connects wth the World (2007) ■ M. Tomasello, Origins of Human Communication (2008) ■ K. Sterelny, The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique (2012).

philosophie cognitive

Conférences Jean-Nicod de Philosophie Cognitive
Cycle 2017

Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
(Institut des Sciences humaines et Sociales)

Fondation Meyer
pour le développement culturel et artistique

École Normale Supérieure

École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales

John Campbell

How Language Enters Perception

John Campbell

Après son D.Phil à l'université d'Oxford, John Campbell y a été nommé Fellow de New College en 1986, puis Wilde Professor of Mental Philosophy en 2000. Il a rejoint en 2014 l'université de Californie à Berkeley où il est actuellement professeur de philosophie. Son travail s'articule autour de deux grands thèmes. Le plus récent porte sur la relation entre notre capacité imaginative à comprendre l'esprit et la conception que nous avons des relations causales entre les états mentaux. Alors que notre capacité imaginative est indépendante d'une connaissance scientifique de l'esprit, la conception causale s'inscrit dans une démarche scientifique. On peut ainsi comparer les expériences visuelles et l'information visuelle dans le cerveau, ou encore s'intéresser aux relations entre les facteurs psychologiques et biologiques en psychiatrie. l'autre thème central de son travail porte sur la relation entre les expériences visuelles et la capacité de faire référence à des objets concrets. Dans ses livres *Reference and Consciousness* (2002) et *Berkeley's Puzzle* (2014, co-écrit avec Quassim Cassam), John Campbell défend l'hypothèse que l'attention consciente est à l'origine de la référence aux objets concrets. Pour cette raison, nous ne devons pas concevoir les expériences visuelles comme de simples sensations qui représentent une scène observée, mais bien comme une relation entre un sujet et la scène elle-même. John Campbell a donné les conférences Whitehead à Harvard, il a été membre du Center for Advanced Study à Stanford et il a obtenu des financements de la fondation Guggenheim, du NEH et de la British Academy

Sélection bibliographique

2017 J. Campbell, Does That Which Makes the Sensation of Blue a Mental Fact Escape Us? In D. Brown and F. MacPherson (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour, London : Routledge.

2017 J. Campbell, Validity and the Causal Structure of a Disorder. In K. Kendler and J. Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry IV: Psychiatric Nosology, Oxford: Oxford University Press

2016 J. Campbell, The Problem of Spatiality for a Relational View of Experience. In C. Hill and B. McLaughlin (eds.), Philosophical Topics, 44

2016 J. Campbell, and Q. Cassam, Berkeley's Puzzle, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

2012 J. Campbell, Lichtenberg and the Cogito, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112, 361-378.

2011 J. Campbell, Why Do Language Use and Tool Use Both Count as Manifestations of Intelligence? In T. McCormack, C. Hoerl and S. Butterfill (eds.), Tool Use and Causal Cognition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 169-182

2011 J. Campbell, An Object-Dependent Perspective on Joint Attention. In A Seeman (ed.) Joint Attention, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 415-430.

2011 J. Campbell, Visual Attention and the Epistemic Role of Consciousness. In C. Mole, D. Smithies and W. Wu (eds.), Attention, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

2010 J. Campbell, Control Variables and Mental Causation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 110, 15-30.*of Philosophy,* XCIX, 8, 1-35.

2002 J. Campbell, Reference and Consciousness, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Conférences Jean-Nicod 2017

How Language Enters Perception

philosophie cognitive

Conférence du 26 septembre
Space and Language

Our ordinary visual experience seems to involve frame of reference phenomena. To use an example of Wittgenstein's, you can imagine two stars circling one another in a pitch-dark sky. The positions of the stars relative to one another stay the same; their absolute locations change. It's as if there's an unseen set of axes with respect to which vision is locating the stars. On one view, this frame of reference is supplied by the shared language. Speakers of languages that use different frames of reference will have different visual experiences. Stephen Levinson has argued for this view over many years. For human subjects, it's also true that the space of visual experience is a geometric space; it's the space about which we reason geometrically. Again it's arguable that this aspect of visual experience is grounded in our understanding of a shared language; Elizabeth Spelke has argued for something like this view. But if our visual experience is grounded in the shared language, there's a basic puzzle about how we have the notion of an objective space at all. In this lecture I lay out the puzzle and look at possible responses.

Conférence du 28 septembre
Time

Perceptual experience has a certain finality, in this sense: when you see something happen, it's happened, and it's now beyond the reach of agency whether it happened or not. In ordinary perceptual experience, the time-order of the world unrolls before us, and things in the past can't be changed. This seems to be an immediately recognizable and pervasive aspect of human experience. I argue that this is not so for much of animal perceptual experience. Consider for example a hypothetical animal the temporal structure of whose experience is grounded entirely in its possession of a circadian clock. The clock can represent only phases; a honeybee, for example, might be able to represent only, 'marmalade on the balcony at 10.00am', without making any distinction between 10.00am on one day and 10.00am on another. Here the time of day is a repeatable phase, and the animal could in principle act to affect whether there is marmalade at 10.00am; any limitation on its powers in this regard is not due merely to the temporal location of the marmalade. The 'finality' of human perceptual experience is not shared by this animal. I argue that this point is not affected when we consider other timing systems generally found in animals. The finality of ordinary perceptual experience seems to be grounded in our grasp of a shared language in which temporally structured narratives of events can be generated.

Conférence du 3 octobre
Tool Use

There is a certain complexity in the ordinary perceptual experience of using a tool, at any rate in the case of what I'll call 'intelligent' tool use. In intelligent tool use, your awareness of the causally relevant physical characteristics of the tool and your target are what guide your use of the tool to perform a given task. If you're using a chisel to shape a piece of wood, for example, your awareness of the sharpness of the blade of the chisel, and the texture of the wood, inform your use of the tool. They do so in a structured way; a skilled tool-user is using the tool in a way systematically responsive to variation in properties like sharpness and texture. Although the intelligent tool user has to be systematically responsive to those characteristics, though, they enter experience only recessively; the attentional focus of the tool user will typically be on the characteristics of the target they are attempting to modify. One of the contrasts between animal tool use and human tool use is that animal tool use generally does not seem to be intelligent in this sense. In this lecture I elaborate on that point and look at the relation between intelligent tool use and grasp of a structured language.

Conférence du 5 octobre
Joint Attention

In a recent book Imogen Dickie has grounded singular reference in what she calls 'the mind's need to represent'. I argue that her talk of a 'need to represent' should itself be located our need for cooperation and collaboration, needs that Michael Tomasello has argued are the source of all distinctively human aspects of cognition. On this way of thinking, it's wrong to approach the theory of reference solipsistically; reference to objects is, rather, grounded in our use of a shared language. This lecture looks at the joint attention that is arguably the foundation of referential thought. I discuss (a) how to characterize the 'openness' that is characteristic of joint attention – the way it is 'out in the open' between you and me which object is in question and what we are about with respect to it, in ordinary cases of joint attention; (b) an argument that joint attention, rather than Gricean intentions, should be regarded as the ground of referential communication, and (c) the sense in which joint attention should be regarded as the epistemic basis for our capacity for imaginative understanding of one another.