

Series of lectures by Asher Koriat

Professor Asher Koriat, (Institute of Information Processing and Decision Making, University of Haïfa, Israel), will present three talks during his stay at Institut Jean-Nicod.

1. The link from action to perception in metacognition.

September 25, 2012, IEC COLLOQUIUM, 12 to 13:30 pm / Salle Paul Langevin, 29 Rue d'Ulm.

Abstract: A common theme in the study of metacognition is that metacognitive feelings are based on the degree of fluency or effort that is experienced during processing. Implied in this theme is the assumption that although metacognitive feelings normally drive and guide control operations, they may be based themselves on the feedback from such operations. Thus, it is by studying a piece of information ("action") that I can assess the likelihood that I will remember it in the future ("perception"). Complications emerge, however, because the on-line feedback from task performance carries different metacognitive implications depending on whether processing effort is attributed to properties of the task (data-driven) or to one's own initiative (goal-driven). Evidence from the study of judgments of learning, feelings of knowing and subjective confidence will be reviewed that testifies for the complex inferential processes underlying the monitoring of one's own knowledge.

2. The crossover model of subjective experience.

October 3, 2012, 14h30-16h30 / Salle Celan, 45 rue d'Ulm

Abstract: The study of metacognitive feelings may shade light on some of the metatheoretical issues concerning the basis and function of subjective experience in general. It is proposed that sheer noetic feelings occupy a unique position, interfacing between implicit-automatic processes, on the one hand, and explicit-controlled processes, on the other. Noetic feelings are based on heuristics that operate implicitly, but once formed, these feelings can affect and guide controlled action. I examine the possibility that the crossover model applies also to perceptual experience and to emotional experience. Some issues regarding this view will be discussed.

3. Epistemic feelings: The bases of subjective convictions and their accuracy.

October 10, 2012, 14h30-16h30 / Salle Celan, 45 rue d'Ulm

Abstract: How do people monitor the correctness of their answers and judgments? A self-consistency model is proposed for the basis of confidence judgments and their accuracy. The model assumes that the process underlying subjective convictions has much in common with that underlying statistical inference about the outside world. Participants behave like intuitive statisticians who attempt to reach a conclusion about a population on the basis of a small sample of observations. Subjective confidence is based on the sampling of clues from memory, and represent an assessment of the likelihood that a new sample will yield the same decision. Results consistent with the model were obtained across several two-alternative forced-choice tasks covering different domains. The model explains some of the basic observations about subjective confidence and generates new predictions.