The Syntax of Taste

1: Introduction: Predicates of personal taste

So-called *predicates of personal taste* (PPTs) have recently attracted a great deal of philosophical and linguistic attention. Such predicates are exemplified below:

(1) a. To ski is *fun*
   b. It is *exciting* to ski
   c. Skiing is *enjoyable*
   d. Liquorice is *tasty*

Clearly, the truth or falsity of the cases in (1), and innumerable other such cases, depends upon a relevant experiencer or judge (someone who finds something fun, exciting, etc.). So little is not denied by anyone. Note, though, that the predicates monadic, and their subjects refer to the stuff or events that are experienced or judged, not agents. The chief question to ask of PPTs, therefore, is how the understanding that an agent is required for the truth of any claim featuring a PPT relates to the fact that no agent at all needs to be linguistically specified in a PPT construction. ‘Contextualists’ argue that an experiencer/judge is a factor of the linguistic content of the utterances that host PPTs, perhaps being the value of a covert variable of PPTs. ‘Relativists’ think of the specification of a relevant agent as determining the assignment of truth value to the PPT host, without the specified agent entering into the propositional content of the utterances. The arguments to follow are not designed to resolve this issue, but do bear upon the dispute. My concern is wholly linguistic: Do PPTs militate for syntactically realised variables, a variable involvement of the third grade? In line with my overarching thesis, I shall argue that they do not. As just intimated, this claim, if true, does refute a certain ‘contextualist’ line of argument in favour of an experiencer/judge being part of linguistic content, but there are many other considerations to assess before concluding anything definite about the semantics and content of cases such as (1). A contextualist, for example, is free to retreat to a second grade of variable involvement. So, PPTs are, for me, another example of the absence of variables in syntax, and my present ambitions do not go beyond establishing merely that.

A good number of theorists, in somewhat different ways, assume or claim that syntax realises experiencer/judge argument positions (overt and covert) for PPTs. The theorists include Glanzberg (2007), Stephenson (2007), Stojanovic (2007), Moltmann (2010a, 2012), Sæbø (2009), Schaffer (2011), and Pearson (2013). The considerations offered in support of this syntactic hypothesis, however, are pretty thin; sometimes, the claim is made with no empirical or theoretical backing at all (Stephenson, 2007; Stojanovic, 2007). Explicit syntactic arguments are to be found, though, especially from Shaffer (2011) and Glanzberg (2007), who offer what they take to be persuasive, if not compelling, reasons for PPTs to project a covert experiencer argument, which may be free or bound. In this regard, they borrow from earlier work of linguists exploring the syntax of evaluative predicates generally. I aim to show that the kind of syntactic argumentation Glanzberg and Schaffer present in fact indicates that the predicates do not project experiencer arguments. The specification of an experiencer for the predicates is a type of syntactic adjunction, and so optional, not a covert argument. Molmann (2010a, 2012) and Pearson (2013) argue for a somewhat distinct account, where the projected argument of the PPT is essentially bound by a higher operator. *Strictu sensu*, this account is consistent with my general claim that syntax does not sanction variables of the formal kind that are either free or bound. As it is, though, I think this position inherits the problems that beset any position that fancies PPTs to project arguments, and it suffers from some other problems unique to it. I shall first consider the
argument vs. adjunct question pertaining to PPTs and then look at a couple of other considerations, including those from Moltmann and Pearson. Before we get to the detail, a number of preliminary observations are in order.

2: The philosophical and linguistic problems of taste
Firstly, independent of the considerations Glanzberg and Schaffer offer, it is at best unclear if PPTs form a natural class whether in terms of syntactic behaviour, semantic properties, or conceptual content. It is obvious enough that there is no surface syntactic individuative condition. Tasty, for example, does not select for infinitive complements (*It is tasty to eat meat) or gerund subjects (*Eating meat is tasty). Fun, on the other hand, is happy in both environments. This difference coheres with a semantic difference: tasty attributes a property to an object, whereas fun attributes a property to an event. Of course, Rollercoasters are fun is acceptable, but such constructions appear elliptical for something of the form Riding rollercoasters is fun. None of this is to suggest that classing fun and tasty together is wholly erroneous. Both predicates express a personal perspective on the relevant object or event, which does have its syntactic correlate in the option of a to/for x phrase that may appear with PPTs. So much, though, does not tell us anything interesting, for the relevant phrases might not be constitutive of the content of PPTs, but merely express additional information by way of adjunction. In effect, the question before is whether this perspectival feature of the predicates is syntactically realised as an argument (as opposed to an adjunct) position, and so does unify the class of PPTs, notwithstanding their other differences. For the purposes of argument, therefore, I shall mostly assume that the differences between fun and tasty do not interfere pro or con with the arguments for both predicates to project an experiencer argument. I say ‘mostly’, for as will become evident, the differences do make a difference in regard to the applicability of the tests for distinguishing arguments from adjuncts.

Secondly, as perhaps already intimated, I shall solely focus on tasty and fun. This is a somewhat thin diet, but I take the choice of examples to be non-prejudicial; indeed, Glanzberg, Schaffer, and others in the field are similarly narrow. If anything, the predicates offer the best intuitive case for the presence of a covert experiencer argument. One could broaden the scope of cases to include aesthetic, moral, and even alethic predicates, but I take there to be much less pretheoretical appeal to think of good, beautiful, and true as essentially experiential or indexed to a judge. Perhaps I betray an intellectual bias (in most moods, I am tempted to #, or even *, It is true for me), but I can scarcely imagine anyone retreating from the claim that tasty projects an experiencer argument to the claim that good and true do. At any rate, I relieve my opponents of the burden of unifying a far wider class of predicate than our chosen examples. Besides: it is transparent how my arguments in regard to fun and tasty generalise should one be so befuddled as to retreat in the way just suggested.

Thirdly, the principal ground of dispute concerning PPTs is not exactly linguistic, but more to do with propositional content. Perhaps the most useful entering point is the notion of faultless disagreement. Let Judy assert (1d) and Jack assert its negation (Liquorice isn’t tasty). On the face of it, Jack and Judy disagree; they contradict each other. The problem is that we appear unable or unwilling (ceteris paribus) to lay blame upon either of them; that is, we want to be able to say that Jack and Judy both assert something true. After all, there is nothing in liquorice itself that will tell us that Jack or Judy are mistaken, and it is hardly necessary that Jack or Judy be in a position to make such a judgment about each other; perforce, a third party is unable to make a such a judgment either. Thus, we appear to have a case of faultless disagreement. Of course, there are cases and cases. Often, we might feel compelled to contradict someone’s judgement of personal taste, perhaps on grounds of the person being typically inattentive or lacking other relevant experience (If you think that isn’t tasty, you should try the merlot. It is disgusting). Even so, PPTs do seem to be peculiarly apt
to give rise to conflicting intuitions, where we want to hold that speakers contradict each other without either being mistaken. There are two basic approaches to this puzzle: relativism and contextualism.

The relativist takes the conflict to be genuine, but seeks to ameliorate the sense of paradox. According to this position, Jack and Judy do disagree, for their attitudes are towards the same propositional content that Liquorice is tasty: Judy asserts it, Jack denies it. Both may be faultless, though, for the truth-value of the one content is assessed relative to different judges or individuals, and so, relative to Jack, the content is false, and relative to Judy it is true. The alternative contextualist position does not seek to save the (apparent) phenomenon of faultless disagreement. The contextualist agrees with the relativist that, in our imagined scenario, neither Judy nor Jack need be at fault, but this is not because the one content is assessed for truth-value relative to each interlocutor; instead, the interlocutors simply judge distinct contents. Judy assents to liquorice is tasty for her whereas Jack denies that liquorice is tasty for him, so there is no contradiction. Both accounts hold that the determination of an experiencer or judge is essential to the fixing of a truth-value for a personal taste utterance. The relativist holds that this determination occurs independently of the fixing of propositional content, which may be invariant over differences of truth-value. The contextualist claims that the determination of an experiencer or judge is an aspect of the content expressed and so cannot occur independently of the fixing of content; without the specification of a relevant individual, Liquorice is tasty is not truth-evaluable at all.

Many subtle issues here, and there are, suffice it to say, numerous ways of capturing the basic relativist and contextualist positions. Note, though, that according to both positions, a relevant individual, even if generically understood, is essential to the full assessment of personal taste utterances; the positions differ only in regard to whether the individual enters into the propositional content or not. For my purposes, all other issues may be bracketed in order to focus on the semantic-syntactic question of how, if at all, the experiencer/judger is linguistically represented. Further note that however this question gets answered does not decide the issue between the relativist and contextualist, although it does affect the dialectical options. I am, therefore, committed to neither position and my arguments affect the dispute only by way of knocking out a contextualist argument. Let me explain.

If one were to consider mere judgements of truth-value or their distribution over possible utterances, it is difficult to disentangle relativism from contextualism, for the difference between the positions is at a sub-truth-value level, as it were; that is, both parties can agree about which utterances are true and which are false in exactly the same contexts. Stojanovic (2007), for instance, argues that relativism and contextualism are notational variants, if strictly construed as semantic claims, as opposed to claims about how values of linguistic items get fixed. This seems right to me, but a wedge can be provided precisely on the basis of the syntactic assumptions the contextualist is liable or happy to make, which the relativist may demur without forfeit. That is to say, leverage is to be found, if we focus on the linguistic material free of truth-value assessment. Effectively, the relativist says that we have a complete proposition independent of the specification of an experiencer/judger and the contextualist says that we don’t. Now assume that at some level of syntactic organisation, all of the constituents of a sentence contribute to the truth conditions of its tokens. Such a level is normally conceived of as logical form (LF), but we may remain neutral on its precise identification. All that is important is that there is some way of determining what constituents of a sentence contribute to truth conditions. So, if an item is theta-marked as an experiencer, then that would suffice to tell us that it contributes to truth conditions. The right level of syntactic organisation, therefore, may simply be where theta-assignment occurs. We now have the basis for a clear assessment of the relativist and contextualist positions. If a PPT essentially projects an experiencer argument position, then that means that contextualism is
true, for if the position is not valued for some given utterance, then we do not have complete truth conditions for the utterance, because truth conditions are computed off the relevant level of organisation of linguistic material, which, *ex hypothesi*, contains an experiencer argument position.

I think this reasoning is valid, but, of course, the argument can be resisted by the relativist or, indeed, eschewed by the contextualist. Both parties might hold that that truth conditions are not to be computed solely on the basis of linguistic material. The relativist, without further ado, would remain unscathed by the argument. The contextualist, for her part, may seek the putative essential experiencer constituent of a PPT content at some level of conceptual structure not linguistically encoded. In short, the relativism vs. contextualism debate is not just a debate about what argument positions PPTs syntactically project. Both relativist and contextualist must treat the judge or experiencer position as variable, insofar as PPTs are useable from different perspectives. I take it that the fixation on the value of the variable is an issue for both sides (cf., Stephenson, 2007). My concern below will be, in effect, just for a particular strong version of the contextualism that treats the variable as syntactically realised.

Still, the argument presented is very interesting, precisely because it does offer the contextualist a potentially decisive argument on the neutral basis of syntax: if PPTs *do* project an experiencer argument position, then the relativist would be obliged to deny that it enters into the determination of truth conditions, which is simply absurd, or at best utterly *ad hoc*. As it is, I think the evidence clearly tells against PPTs projecting the relevant argument position, but I do not favour relativism. For what it worth, I think people tend to project personal taste properties as objective, and whether they accept faultlessness in disputes or not is contingent on a host of factors, but it not the default. As for contextualism, I think Glanzberg (2007) makes a good case that PPTs are multi-dimensional in terms of the scales we employ to assess their being satisfied or not, and this might well be a semantic matter. As said, though, my current interest is just in whether PPTs project an experiencer argument position that is contextually valued. I shall argue that they do not, which, as explained, knocks away a powerful argument for contextualism, but it by no means refutes the position.

Fourthly, the considerations I shall be assessing for a syntactically realised covert experiencer argument of PPTs are not treated as unassailable by either Glanzberg or Schaffer (or anyone else, as far as I know). Glanzberg (2007, p. 11-12, n. 9) treats the claim as a ‘working hypothesis... the strongest position [of the options], and the one I would find most congenial’. Still, the position ‘needs more investigation’. Similarly, Schaffer (2011, p. 192) says the following:

- It should be acknowledged from the start that all of these diagnostics [for covert arguments as applied to PPTs] are defeasible, embody controversial theoretical assumptions, and require judgments that may be contested. Such is unavoidable in empirical inquiry. The *best-case result* is when all the diagnostics converge. I will be claiming just such a best-case result for taste claims. Such sentiments of caution properly reflect the complexity of the issues involved. Still, my conclusion will be the exact opposite of the conclusion Schaffer seeks: all of the diagnostics he employs point towards PPTs not projecting an experiencer argument, and additional considerations also point in the same direction.

3: **On the putative evidence for syntactic variables**

My method will be as follows. Firstly, I shall go through four tests Schaffer (partially endorsed by Glanzberg) presents for an experiencer being a value of a syntactic argument of PPTs. In each case I shall show that the test does not deliver the result claimed for it; on the contrary, the tests suggest that the experiencer position is a position of adjunction, which as
an optional projection does not tell us anything essential about the semantic character of PPTs. Secondly, I shall look at some further tests, not discussed by Schaffer, that clearly point in the same direction. Two points are worth emphasis here. Firstly, I shall assume for the purposes of argument that there can be obligatory argument positions that are mostly covertly realised and, more generally, that the broad syntactic assumptions that admit covert material are perfectly in order. The crucial issue is solely whether PPTs offer a case for covert free variables, with all other syntactic and semantic properties kept constant.

Secondly, and here I repeat a point from chapter vbvn, the issue of how to distinguish arguments from adjuncts, if at all, is highly fraught. The present issue, however, is not really about the argument/adjunct distinction, but about the semantic content of PPTs; the argument/adjunct distinction is being used as a probe on the understanding that arguments reflect constitutive content of predicates whereas adjuncts do not. So, all parties should recognise that (i) the syntactic distinction between arguments and adjuncts may cross-classify the semantic distinction between core and auxiliary information and that (ii) assigning some information to adjunction projections does not entail that anything goes. The so-called ‘cartography’ programme has made it at least plausible that all items of a structure find a place within a functional hierarchy, which realises a template of how items may be construed in relation to one another (Rizzi, 1997; Cinque, 1999, 2002; Haegeman, 2012). As we shall see, this approach problematises some diagnostics for adjuncts insofar as one can’t simply assume that restrictions on the permissible order of phrases entails that the phrases are arguments, for adjuncts cannot be positioned willy-nilly; the phenomenon might, instead, reflect the relative prominence of covert functional heads that take the overt phrases as SPECs. Be that as it may, cartography issues are mostly neutral in the present dispute. The contextualist claims, and I deny, that PPTs obligatorily project an experiencer argument. The cartographic theorist, as it were, claims that if and when items occur within a structure, they fit into the hierarchical functional template; the theorist does not claim that the template must always be realised, albeit sometimes covertly. The point may be put like this. The cartography theorist does not reject the argument/adjunct distinction, but claims that both arguments and adjuncts occur within a functional hierarchy; the difference between the two is that arguments are obligatory and adjuncts not. So, for present purposes, arguments are syntactically obligatory items that reflect core semantic properties of the predicates, and adjuncts are non-obligatory items, which may reflect core conceptual information, but, qua optional, do not reflect the narrow linguistic content of the item.

3.1: The binding test

I shall begin with a methodological point, and then assess the crucial cases. Schaffer (2011, p. 192) notes that ‘[o]ne leading diagnostic for covert arguments is the possibility of binding them’, and he cites Partee (1989) and Stanley (2000) as evidence. As already discussed in the previous chapter, though, binding does not offer a test for syntactically realised covert arguments; indeed, Partee is explicit that she does not think of the test in that way. For the test to work in the way Schaffer intends, one needs the assumption that all binding is syntactically realised, but I know of no good argument for such a grand claim. Pretty clearly, one can have binding and relations of referential dependence that are not underwritten by general syntactic relations. As we shall also see in the next chapter, scope relations involving indefinites are highly problematic, if understood as realised by general syntactic mechanisms. Schaffer (ibid., p. 193) says the following:

The standard view of binding is that it is a syntactic relation, requiring the right syntactic environment (basically, co-indexing and c-command: Chomsky 1981). On this view the possibility of bound readings is excellent evidence for the syntactic reality
of the argument in question… But alternative semantic views of binding have also been proposed. For present purposes I remain neutral as between syntactic and semantic views of binding. I only assume that bound readings require the existence of arguments in logical form, whether or not these arguments are syntactically projected. In particular I assume that bound readings reveal the pre-existence of the argument… In a slogan, I assume that the quantifier reveals structure rather than creating it [sic].

I find this passage somewhat confusing. Firstly, I would wager that no-one in the field, and certainly not Chomsky, endorses the classic GB account of binding in the full generality Schaffer states. Yet even if classic GB binding is accepted, the inference Schaffer draws is invalid. Classic binding theory pertains to elements that occur within a syntactic projection, not to any and all binding intuitions one may have. Thus, bound readings alone are not enough to attract a binding theoretic explanation and so not enough to establish the ‘syntactic reality’ of the relevant items. For example, it might be that one has independent reason to think that the relevant putative argument is not syntactically projected, in which case binding theory does not apply to it as a syntactic condition. This is precisely the position of Partee (1989) and Chomsky (1986) as regards ‘implicit arguments’. Schaffer does concede that there are ‘semantic alternatives’ (he cites Schlenker, 2005), but my present point does not rest on the possibility of ‘alternatives’; it is, rather, that syntactic binding theory was never intended as an account of any and all bound readings, so such a class of readings all by itself is not evidence for syntactic arguments.

Secondly, since Schaffer does concede ‘semantic alternatives’ and is ‘neutral’ about the explanation of bound readings, the significance of the binding test is moot even in his own eyes. Before the binding test can be weighed in terms of a ‘best-result’ convergence of considerations on a syntactic explanation of the semantics of PPTs, it needs to be established that the test even purports to reveal a (covert) syntactic position that is otherwise identifiable. Schaffer and others do not do this. What Schaffer does settle on is that the test reveals a position in ‘logical form’ that is demonstrated by the relevant quantifier readings, instead of created. The position Schaffer (2011, p. 193, n. 22) here has in mind is Recanati’s (2004, 2007, 2010) variadic function account of implicit object arguments discussed in the previous chapter. Precisely what Schaffer wishes to claim in the passage, though, is unclear. Obviously, ‘logical form’ cannot refer to the syntactic level of LF. It must, therefore, refer to some level of conceptual articulation that encodes truth conditions and is somehow linguistically licensed, an aspect of literal meaning, one might say. Such a conception, though, does not exclude a variadic account of the relevant readings, which Recanati precisely intends to be an account of logical form in that sense. What the account does claim, at least as Recanati presents it, is that the relevant argument positions are not aspects of the lexical entries of the given predicates at issue, for punkt readings are available. As things stand, therefore, the exact character of the neutral position Schaffer seeks to adopt is unclear.

The above two points should give us serious pause in considering the binding test as even bearing upon the issue at hand. As it is, the data Schaffer offers do even suggest a covert experiencer argument for PPTs.

Consider (2):

(2) Everyone got something tasty

The unbound reading is one where everyone got the same thing (chocolate ice cream, say) and found it tasty. The crucial bound reading is where what is tasty varies or depends upon, the range of the initial universal quantifier. So, Ma can utter (2) to her three children and mean (and be understood as so meaning) that Mary got something tasty for her, Daisy got something tasty for her, and Jimmy got something tasty for him, where what the three
children got may differ between them. Schaffer’s thought is that the second reading is supported by a structure roughly corresponding to (3):

(3) (Every person \(x\))(something \(y\))[\(x\) got \(y\) \(\land \) \(y\) is tasty for \(x\)]

The significant relation here is that the initial quantifier binds into a position in the scope of tasty, rendering the value of \(x\) an experiencer of something being tasty. Without such a position being there already, so the thought goes, such a construal would not be possible.

Assume that (2) is ambiguous in the way indicated. Still, one might wonder what this tells us about tasty. Perhaps the ambiguity indicated is general and so does not turn on the particular argument structure of tasty. To test for this, Schaffer (ibid., p. 194) presents three other examples that he claims are ‘without bound readings’, unlike (2):

(4)a Everyone got something frozen
b Everyone got something round
c Everyone got something artificially sweetened

Schaffer offers no discussion of these cases, so I am not sure exactly what readings are meant to be ruled out. It is obvious enough that none of the cases in (4) admit the kind of structural paraphrase presented in (3), if for no other reason then that frozen/round/artificially sweetened for \(x\) are semantically deviant. Yet this difference cannot be presently presupposed as demonstrative of a covert argument position apt to be bound, for the binding test is intended to reveal an independent phenomenon that explains that difference. That is to say, the test is supposed to reveal a difference between (2) and (4) that is best explained by a syntactic projection covertly holding for (2) but not (4), such that the ‘syntactic reality’ of the projection explains the experiencer reading of (2) and the unavailability of such readings for (4). But what is the independent phenomenon? Think again about Ma and her three children Mary, Daisy, and Jimmy. Clearly, all of the cases in (4) support readings where the three children got different things that happened to be frozen (Mary got a pizza, Daisy got a bag of peas, etc.), round (Mary got a ball, daisy got a mirror, etc.), or artificially sweetened (Mary got a juice drink, daisy got a sorbet, etc.), just as (2) supports the case where the children got different things that happened to be tasty. In short, as far as I can see, there just is no quantifier dependence relation that distinguishes the cases in (4) from (2). If that is right, then (3) is, in fact, too rich a paraphrase of the relevant reading of (2), at least as far as the binding test goes. What all the cases share is a scope ambiguity between the existential taking wide or narrow scope with respect to the initial universal quantifier. The narrow scope readings are true of the cases where the things got are dependent on the values of the universally bound quantifier:

(5)a (Every person \(x\))(something \(y\))[\(x\) got \(y\) \(\land \) \(y\) is tasty]
b (Every person \(x\))(something \(y\))[\(x\) got \(y\) \(\land \) \(y\) is frozen/round/artificially sweetened]

To be sure, Schaffer might well be right to think that we prefer the paraphrase in (3) to the one in (5a), but that is not a matter determined or even suggested by the binding test, whose deliverances are merely consistent with such a preference, which might be explained by our conception of what it is for something to be tasty, which has nothing to do with binding. So, as far as tasty goes, the binding test tells us nothing.

Schaffer (ibid., pp. 194-5) offers the same kind of argument for fun as he offers for tasty. Again imagine Ma and her three children. At the fair, Mary went on the rollercoaster’s, Daisy went on the helter-skelter, and Jimmy went on the lucky-dip. On the way home, Ma utters (6):
Everyone did something fun

is ambiguous. One reading is where everyone did the same thing. Again, the relevant reading is the bound one, where what the children did that was fun differs between them, so that what was fun is dependent on the range of values of the initial universal quantifier. I am not sure how Schaffer would wish to analyse (6), but I take (7) to be the kind of structure/paraphrase he has in mind on the model of (3):

(7) (Every person x)(some event e)[ACT(x, e) and fun(e, x)]

Here I take ‘ACT(x, e)’ to express x being an actor or participant in the event e, and ‘fun(e, x)’ to express e being an event that was fun for x (fun is a dyadic relation between an event and an actor in the event). We can be neutral about detail. As before, we need to ask whether such a reading tells us anything about fun in particular, or whether the ambiguity is perfectly general. Schaffer offers the following cases parallel to those in (4) that are supposed not to have bound readings, and so demonstrate that the bound reading of (6) does have something to do with the predicate fun:

(8)a Everyone did something legal
   b Everyone did something sedentary
   c Everyone did something environmental

I shall not rehearse the relevant reasoning that pertains to these cases as pertains to the cases in (4). Suffice it to note that all of them support readings where the existential is in the scope of the initial universal quantifier, and so support truth conditions under which the events that are legal, sedentary, and environmental vary with the values of the initial quantifier. As before, we have to take back the initial analysis as being richer than the binding test licenses. In this case, the simple amendment is to construe fun to be monadic, so that it just takes an event argument, as opposed to dyadic. We might prefer the dyadic construal of fun; that is not in dispute. That construal, though, is not uniquely supported by the binding test as Schaffer presents it. The test is minimally supposed to present independent evidence for the construal, not data merely consistent with it.

There are other cases. Glanzberg (2007, p. 10) offers (9a) as a ‘possibility of binding into the experiencer position’ and the bare (9b) would also serve:

(9)a Everyone had a fun vacation
   b Everyone had fun

The additional interest of these cases is that they do not feature two quantifier phrases and the constructions are restricted to a fairly narrow class of predicate. As with the previous cases, the sentences in (9) are ambiguous: they support a reading where everyone had the same fun together and a reading where different people had different kinds of fun. As it stands, though, the second bound reading does not militate for the projection of an experiencer argument. That is, there is nothing in the available readings of (9) that oblige us to favour (10a-b) over (10c-d) for the second kind of reading:

(10)a (every person x)(some event e)[ACT(x, e) & fun-vacation(e, x)]
   b (every person x)(some event e)[ACT(x, e) & fun(e, x)]
   c (every person x)(some event e)[ACT(x, e) & fun-vacation(e)]
d (every person x)(some event e)[ACT(x, e) & fun(e)]

As before, the ambiguity can be resolved in terms the relative scope relations of the quantifiers without appeal to an extra argument position being bound by the universal. The choice, in other words, is between treating the relevant predicates as monadic or dyadic, and binding gives us no definite steer on which is the right account.

There is a complication here concerning the possibility of a free experiencer variable. Recall that the basic motivation for contextualism about PPTs is that the experiencer of the tasty object or fun event is variable, it may be the speaker, the addressee, or some other salient person or group, with the overt linguistic material kept constant. This is supposed to be revealed by the availability of all manner of overt experiencer arguments (…tasty/fun for Bill/me/you/everyone, etc.). If this is so, then one should wonder if the kind of cases exemplified in (2), (6), and (9) admit free construals along with the unbound cases. Such construals are somewhat odd. It is, anyway, hard to read Everyone had a fun vacation as saying that everyone had a fun vacation for me, without the entailment that the values of the universal quantifier have had a fun vacation. I shall return to this issue presently, but for the moment, consider the options. Assume that the contextualist claims that the free construals are impossible. The truth of this claim cannot follow from the syntax as so far imagined, for assuming that fun and tasty project an argument independently of any higher quantifier, which is an explicit assumption of Schaffer’s (see above), then there is no syntactic basis for claiming that some such quantifier has to be in place to bind the otherwise free variable. After all, the variable is precisely supposed to be free where there is no antecedent quantifier. Furthermore, the quantification when present is not vacuous, as it binds a position in the subject restriction (witness (3a), (7), and (10a-b)). So, if the free construals are impossible, then it appears not to be a syntactic effect, but a wider semantic effect, perhaps due to experiences being subject-centred such that one cannot experience or gainsay others’ experiences. Whatever the explanation might be, note that the denier of an experiencer argument is in a stronger dialectical position than the contextualist. The contextualist appears to be lumbered with being obliged to explain an unrealised reading that is apparently syntactically licensed. The opponent, on the other hand, has no syntactic assumptions that license such a reading in the first place and may freely help herself to whatever the best explanation happens to be.11

The other option for the contextualist is to admit the free construals as kosher, but explain away their oddness in terms of bizarre truth conditions, say. Again, though, this does not leave the contextualist in a stronger dialectical position than the denier of a syntactically realised experiencer argument. Firstly, the opponent does not deny the relevant readings, but merely claims that they are not syntactically licensed in terms of the saturation of an argument position. So, both parties can think that the sentences may attract bizarre truth conditions. Secondly, as it happens, I think the untoward readings are not so unacceptable, but this, as we shall see, undermines another consideration of Schaffer and Glanzberg.

2.2: The licensing test
Schaffer (2011, pp. 195-8) and Glanzberg (2007, p. 11, n. 9) appeal to the behaviour of overt experiencer phrases in order to argue that the predicates that take such phrases mark them as arguments, as opposed to adjuncts, and so we may infer the presence of a covert experiencer position, on the assumption that argument structure is always syntactically projected. Of course, the mere fact that we may append for/to x onto a PPT does not indicate that the phrase is an argument as opposed to an adjunct, which we are assuming to be always optional. Schaffer and Glanzberg appeal to two tests, both of which should be familiar from my discussion of It’s raining (see Chapter x). First consider the constraint that arguments cannot
be separated from their predicate (the item that confers a semantic role upon them) by an adjunct or other material (an adverbial or a relative clause, say). So, to use Glanzberg’s example:

(11)a John kissed Mary on the beach  
    b *John kissed on the beach Mary

The point here is that kiss takes two arguments, and on the beach is a paradigmatic adjunct, so (11a) is OK, because the adjunct does not intervene between the verb and its arguments, whereas (11b) is not OK because one does find such an intervention. Schaffer (2011, p. 197) applies the test to tasty and fun with the following examples:

(12)a Liquorice is tasty to me when sober  
    b *Liquorice is tasty when sober to me  
    c Roller coasters are fun for me when sober  
    d *Roller coasters are fun when sober for me

For the moment, let us agree that the judgements indicated are correct. The general claim, however, is not supported, for some adjuncts can intervene between PPTs and their putative argument with much more acceptable results:

(13)a Liquorice is tasty on Tuesdays for me (as opposed to Wednesdays after the dentist)  
    b Roller coasters are fun on the beach for me (as opposed to in town centres)  
    c Football is fun in the park for me (as opposed to indoors)  
    d Ice-cream is tasty in a cone for me (as opposed to in a dish)

I admit that placing the adjunct last is probably the preferred option, but none of these cases are anywhere near as bad as (11b) and innumerable other such cases one may readily formulate. There is, suffice it to say, great variation in the naturalness of the choice of adjunct with the choice of predicate. The bottom line, though, is that such variation does not pertain to (11b), which is supposed to be the paradigm of illicit intervention to which the PPT cases correspond. As for (12), the confounding factor appears to be when sober, which implies an understood individual, for the subject of the sentence (liquorice or roller coasters) can’t be sober. I suggest, therefore, that the oddness of (12b) and (12d) is due to the initial interpretation of the subject of sobriety being understood to be the speaker (or at least a class including the speaker), which information the adjunct then duplicates. The cases in (14) are fine and are naturally understood with the speaker (or a class including her) as the subject of sobriety:

(14)a Liquorice is tasty when sober  
    b Roller coasters are fun when sober

Of course, the understood subject of sobriety can be the addressee or the generic person, but one gets essentially the same effect: a following experiencer adjunct will either conflict with or duplicate what one initially understands to be the subject of sobriety. In sum, the intervention test gives at best a variable judgement about the argument status of overt experiencers, and not a result that would significantly contribute to an all-round weighting of the best explanation of the various phenomena. What one here witnesses, I think, is an effect of complex semantic and lexical factors that determine the acceptability of predicates combined with adjuncts, not a clear explanation on the lines of (11).
The other constraint Schaffer (2011, p. 198) and Glanzberg (2007, p. 11, n. 9) present is one that allows adjuncts to stack or iterate in a way arguments cannot do. Consider the following judgements, drawn from Schaffer and Glanzberg:

(15)a *John kissed Mary Sally  
   b John kissed Mary on the beach under the stars at midnight

(16)a *Sushi is tasty to me to Mary to everyone  
   b *Roller coasters are fun for Ann for Ben for Claire

(15) exemplifies what we expect, where a predicate (the verb kiss, in this case) has a strict number of arguments, and so cannot support iterated would-be arguments, but can support iterated adjuncts, which offer additional optional information. (16) is supposed to present the interesting case, where we find the absence of iteration of experiencers. The significance of this reasoning is wholly vitiated by a lack of attention to other factors.

Arguments do not stack because predicates tend to have a strict number of them, or at least a small upper limit. Adjuncts can stack, but it just doesn’t follow that any sequence of adjuncts is OK. In particular, iteration of adjuncts, or adjectives or adverbials, appears to be constrained. For present purposes, we need not take a definite stand on these subtle matters; it suffices to note that adjuncts of the same type cannot stack in a semantically unconstrained way. Consider:

(17)a John kissed Mary on the beach on the grass on the car’s roof  
   b John kissed Mary in Manchester in London in Birmingham

The examples in (17) have two readings. The most natural readings are the ones where there are three distinct kissing events identifiable by their distinct locations. On these readings, the sentences appear to be elliptical lists or conjunctions. We may wish to rule out such cases as genuine adjunction, for the adjuncts do not modify the preceding phrases. This is significant, for when the adjuncts are of the same type, an order of inclusion seems mandatory; when the adjuncts are distinct, no such inclusive ordering can apply. Thus, the second available readings are the bizarre ones, where a beach is on grass on top of a car and Birmingham contains London as a part, which in turn contains Manchester. So, the only natural non-bizarre readings of (17) render the cases as non-adjunctional, because of the constraint on how iterated phrases of the same type must be interpreted. If this is right, then the cases in (16) give way to a straightforward explanation that treats for/to x as nothing other than an adjunct.

Consider (16) again. First note that if the iterated phrases are arguments, then the sentences should be as bad as (15a), for arguments don’t iterate at all. As it is, the cases in (16) should not be *-ed for they are ambiguous, much like those in (17). On one marginal reading, they claim that a list of people find sushi tasty and another list of people find roller coasters fun. This is the elliptical conjunction reading. The interesting case is the reading where adjunction of the same type imposes an inclusion ordering. Both sentences of (16) are rendered bizarre, much like those of (17) are, although the bizarreness differs, of course. For (16a), the reading would have everyone having the experience of Mary having the experience of oneself finding sushi tasty, with oneself and Mary potentially not in fact having the specified experiences (mutatis mutandis for (16b)). Such truth conditions are suitably absurd, perhaps more so than Birmingham containing Manchester and London. I shall leave it to the reader to indulge in the relevant sci-fi. The crucial point is that (16) perfectly patterns with (17), both of which can be explained in terms of the constraints on stacked adjuncts of the
same type without appeal to experiencer arguments. It is well to note in this regard that there is no dispute that the adjunct \textit{for/to x} does receive an experiencer interpretation, much as \textit{on x} receives a spatial interpretation and \textit{in x} receives a container interpretation. It is such interpretations that enter into the explanations offered. None of this, though, indicates that the phrases as they occur in the above examples are arguments, at least if we are taking (15) as the benchmark. To be sure, (15a) is also susceptible to a list reading, although somewhat more marginal than (16) or (17). The crucial thing about (15), though, is that it has no other reading, not even a bizarre one.\textsuperscript{14}

I shall discuss below a number of other tests that distinguish arguments from adjuncts, which point in the same direction as the tests just discussed. \textit{Pro tem}, it seems to me that taking the \textit{for/to x} phrase to be an argument does not even begin to explain the relevant phenomena, let alone offer a best explanation of them.

2.3: The control test

As discussed in chapter X, the phenomenon of control is a fiercely contested topic in syntax and semantics. For present purposes, though, we may side-line much of this controversy, although I shall return to some aspects of the disputes below. \textit{Pro tem}, assume that a range of structures project a covert pronominal item, which is designated ‘PRO’. In particular, PRO occurs as the subject of non-finite clauses and can be obligatorily bound or controlled by an antecedent or can be free or arbitrary, in which case PRO takes an indefinite/generic reading (see below).\textsuperscript{15} Just to recap, then:

(18)a Bill\textsubscript{i} tried [PRO\textsubscript{i} to leave] (obligatory subject control)
   b Bill asked Mary\textsubscript{i} [PRO\textsubscript{i} to leave] (obligatory object control)
   c PRO smoking is a bad habit (arbitrary)
   d To swim regularly is a good exercise (arbitrary)

There are lots of other environments in which PRO arguably occurs, but for our purposes, the above cases suffice. Further note that where control is obligatory, it appears that an antecedent controller must be in a local position of c-command over PRO.

Assume that control is a well-understand mechanism. It can now seem as if a control reading is an indicator of an antecedent controller. In the cases of (18a) and (18b), the controller is overt, but the same reasoning may lead one to posit a covert controller precisely in order to capture the control construal. As previously discussed, the standard case here, and the one Schaffer (2011, p. 198) cites, is the contrast between passive and inchoative \textit{sink}:

(19)a *The ship sank to collect the insurance
   b The ship was sunk to collect the insurance

The thought is that passive \textit{sink} projects an agentive \textit{by}-phrase that may serve to control the PRO in the subordinate clause. Hence it is that (18b) is OK. Inchoative \textit{sink} does not project an argument, save for the theme/patient subject (\textit{the ship}), which cannot control PRO without producing a bizarre reading. This reasoning is not sound as an argument for the positing of an implicit (covert) agentive argument (cf., Williams, 1985; Landau, 2000; Bhatt and Pancheva, 2006; Collins, 2007), but for the moment, assume that the argument goes through. Schaffer thinks that such reasoning applies to PPTs too and so gives us evidence that they project an experiencer, much as passive \textit{sink} projects an agent.

Schaffer (ibid., p. 199) asks us to consider the pair in (20):

(20)a It is fun [PRO to dance]
b It is popular [PRO to dance]

He then writes:

To see that “fun” is doing something special—namely projecting an experiencer argument—which is generating the control relation, contrast [(20a) with (20b)]… [(20b)] simply comments on the social regard of the practice of dancing. There is no control reading of [(20b)], presumably because “popular” does not project any argument that could control PRO. Hence I conclude that the best explanation for the control reading of [(20a)], and the contrast between [(20a)] and [(20b)], is that taste predicates project syntactically real experiencer arguments.

Such reasoning, of course, can’t apply to tasty, which doesn’t take non-finite complements. Schaffer (ibid., p. 199, n. 32) acknowledges this restriction, but makes nothing of it.16 Still, if the case offered is a good one for fun, then that should be compelling grounds to posit a syntactic projection for fun. As it is, the reasoning is awry.

First off, and this is to repeat the moral of chapter X, it is simply not the case that contrasts such as (19) together with a standard understanding of obligatory control entail the syntactic projection of an implicit argument. The control reading might be lexically or semantically licensed without the projection of a controller. For one thing, note that the agent(s) sinking the ship need not be the agent(s) collecting the insurance. In other words, a control reading is not obligatory as it is with standard cases of subject and object control. This is further evidenced by the subordinate clause of (19b) being able to occur higher than the passive clause, without an effect on the content, which is impossible with (18a) and (18b), for example:

(21)a To collect the insurance the boat was sunk
   b *To leave Bill tried
   c *To leave Bill asked Mary

On the standard theory of control, PRO in (21a) cannot be controlled, and it does not, anyway, have an essential control reading (Collins, 2007; Lasersohn, 2007, p. 369). In (21a) the would-be covert controller associated with the predicate is not in a local c-command position relative to PRO (we shall return to this point presently). The contrast in (19) remains unaffected, but for the undisputed reason that ships don’t collect insurance. So, there is no inference to the best explanation in the offering here. For such an inference to go through, it would have to be established that a syntactic projection is required to realise an ‘implicit argument’ and that the apparent lack of control in the passive cases as described is explicable in a way that doesn’t undermine the putative syntactic projection. As things stand, one finds no good reason from the theory of control to posit syntactic arguments that are otherwise unmotivated.

Saying so much, however, leaves the contrast in (20) unexplained. Note, though, that the syntactically based control reading of (20a) is problematic in the same way as (19b) is in light of (21a). Thus:

(22) To dance is fun

(22) has a control reading alright, at least in the sense that whoever is having fun is the one dancing, which distinguishes this case from the passive sink case. Crucially, however, it is unobvious how to have PRO controlled by an experiencer in (22) as much as in (21a).17 If, then, (20a) and (22) are not cases of syntactic control, then what is the right account? Perhaps
the account is simply that PRO is arbitrary, which does not mean that it is a variable that
takes an arbitrary value, but rather that it is indefinite or generic. So, where for one interprets
PRO, we have

(23)a It is fun for one to dance
   b For one to dance is fun

It follows that the person having fun is the person dancing precisely because fun is predicated
of the dancing event involving the indefinite agent of the dancing, and no other object. This is
achieved without the positing of a syntactically realised experiencer, but follows from the
semantics of fun: for there to be fun, there must be an experiencer, but so much doesn’t
amount to an argument for a syntactic relation of control. What, then, of the contrast with the
popular cases?

(24)a It is popular to dance
   b To dance is popular

Well, there isn’t the relevant contrast. The cases in (24) have an arbitrary PRO interpretation
just as in (23). The difference is that popular can only be predicated to a type or kind of event,
which does not entail that any specific event of that type is popular; no particular event can be
popular. The same goes for rare, if substituted for popular. Patently, no particular event
can be rare, although a type of event might be. So, the difference is that some predicates
(popular, rare) impose a kind or type reading on the event that doesn’t license an existential
inference to any particular event having the given property. Other predicates, such as fun,
also have a generic reading, but do license the existential inference, and so the control-type
reading. Arbitrary PRO is generic in both cases, but gets either an existential or a purely
generic reading depending on the predicate. This kind of distinction applies elsewhere, of
course; for, if I am right about average, then DPs such as The average American are
interpreted as supporting an existential inference or not on the basis of the kind of predicates
they take (chapter vbvn). Either way, control here which needn’t be syntactically supported.

One needn’t accept the above proposal to see that Schaffer’s account is non-explanatory.
Even if one accepted that fun does syntactically project an experiencer argument that controls
PRO, the difference between (23) and (24) would remain to be explained, which the theory of
control does not do.

I have so far considered the ‘control test’ from a traditional perspective on PRO and
control, following Schaffer himself. It is worthwhile to pause, though, to see if alternative
accounts give better results.

A serious complaint against the applicability of the control test is that (22) supports
the same reading as (20a), even though the would-be controller in (22) is not in a local c-
command position relative to PRO. It might be, however, that such a stricture needs to be
relaxed for independent reasons. Polinsky and Potsdam (2002) present evidence for backward
control in Tsez (a Caucasus language), and further work has found evidence for it in other
languages, which this initial work suggested. Control in this case is, again, between a covert
item and an overt item, but the covert item is in a higher position, allowing for a structure
akin to

(25) e, began [Bill, to leave],

where Bill is understand to designate the value of both thematic positions in the matrix and
subordinate clauses. If backward control is a real phenomenon, might it ameliorate or even
dissolve the problem with (22), for that problem was precisely one of the apparent controller being lower than PRO?

One immediate problem is that backward control strongly suggests that control is in fact a species of raising as per the so-called movement theory of control discussed in chapter x.\textsuperscript{19} The crucial point here is that the dual predication of control structures is theorised not in terms of an additional pronominal item (PRO), but rather in terms of a single item and its copy being assigned distinct theta-roles, one in the launch site and one in the landing site, where the initial item is copied. In effect, therefore, backward control is a species of forward raising, as it were. If this is the right way of viewing the matter, then the problem of (22) remains at least as severe as it was. Backward control, like normal obligatory control, requires an overt controller, which (22) lacks. So, even if backward control were perfectly kosher, it would not offer a basis from which to understand the intended analysis of (22), where both controller and controlee are understood to be covert. This conclusion is obvious, if backward control is a species of raising, which involves an item being spelt-out at, or overtly displaced to, a position distinct from its first merge position.

All that said, the possibility of a backward control relation, however realised, offers some succour to Schaffer as regards (22). The problem remains, of course, of how to understand the control relation syntactically. One idea would be to think of the control relation being established with the non-finite clause in its low position, which is retained when the clause as a whole moves up, with the expletive subject somehow deleted:

(26a) It is fun <for α><[PRO] to dance>  
     b [PRO to dance] is fun <for α> <[PRO, to dance]>

Such a proposal, however, constitutes a whole new analysis of control rather than instance of the traditional model with a crucial modification. Obligatory control is supposed to be established on the basis of configuration (i.e., the presence of a controller in the right position) and the constituent lexical items, which determine whether the structure is object or subject control. Hence it is that (21b) and (21c) are unacceptable. On the proposal just mooted, both conditions are disregarded, in favour of, in effect, the retention of a structural relation in a distinct kind of structure. The mistake is encouraged by an uncritical view of indexes. Correctly viewed, indexes are not elements of a structure that can be retained across movement, but theoretical artefacts to indicate relations of construal that are fixed independently of indexes, such as via the configurational and lexical conditions on control as indicated. From this perspective, the indexes in (26) only indicate the intended readings, but go no way to show how such readings are syntactically supported.

An alternative analysis along backward control lines might attempt to do without PRO, and view control as a forwards or backwards movement relation of the arguments, without any movement of the clauses themselves:

(27a) It is fun <for α> [<α> to dance]  
     b [<α> to dance] is fun <for α>

As noted, though, it is not obvious how to understand such relations in a wholly covert way as is here required. The best conclusion we can reach, I think, for a backward control analysis of (22) and similar structures is that it is presently unclear even how to formulate the would-be proposal, but the bare idea of backward control (that the controlee might be higher than the controller) does suggest that a syntactic analysis of (22) that supports the intended covert control reading is not impossible. Note, though, that exploring this possibility would involve
ditching the traditional syntactic assumptions that were supposed to make the control test a good indicator of covert arguments, i.e., the presence of a local commanding controller.

Another alternative to traditional theories of control is to review the relation as (more or less) semantically licensed. At least in the hands of Culicover and Jackendoff (2006), this kind of approach is motivated by the apparent latitude there is to control structures, which appear to lack any underlying syntactic unity. In particular, control of some kind appears possible even without a controller:

(28)a The French agreement to raise the steel tariffs was met with outrage
b The US attempt to dominate oil supply is no longer to be doubted

Patently, the agent of the raising of the tariffs and the dominating of the oil supply is non-arbitrary, but there is no apparent antecedent for PRO in these cases. For present purposes, I am remain perfectly neutral on how best to understand such cases. There are, though, two broad options available, neither of which may be happily endorsed by one who thinks that control signals an experiencer in PPTs. One option that retains the traditional analysis of control as far as possible is to view such cases as highly ‘marked’; that is, they are acceptable structures, but do not reflect the core machinery of syntax, being in some sense figural, marginal for many speakers, subject to late acquisition, and so on. If that is so, though, then, without further ado, one might say exactly the same thing about the apparent control properties of fun. Fun realises a control reading, but it has no syntactic license; it is merely a lexical implication of some kind, much as is witnessed in (28). Another option would be to embrace the apparent syntactic latitude of control relations. To take that option, however, is just to give up on using control as a test for covert syntactic projections.

Much more could be said about control, but I hope enough has been said to establish that employing control to test for covert syntactic arguments is by no means straightforward and does not in any clear way contribute to a ‘best-result’ convergence on PPTs projecting an experiencer.

2.4: The sluicing test
Sluicing is a complex form of clausal ellipsis. On the standard analysis, it consists of the elided (covert) clause being the TP complement of an overt wh-item in SPEC-CP, which has moved from a lower position in the TP clause. (29) offers an example, where underlining indicates coverness:

(29) Bill kissed someone, but I can’t remember [CP who [TP Bill kissed <who>]]

Assume, as is standard, that ellipsis is licensed under an identity condition with the antecedent. In principle, therefore, the nature of the ellipsis will indicate the constituents of the antecedent, even the covert ones. It is this possibility that Schaffer (2011, p. 199-201) seeks to exploit to test for an experiencer argument. Thus, compare the cases in (30):

(30)a The cheese is tasty, but for whom?
   b *The cheese is round, but for whom?

(30a) appears to be a case of sluicing, in which case it receives the (partial) analysis

(31) The cheese is tasty <for α>, but [CP for whom [TP the cheese is tasty <for whom>]]
So, the experiencer argument must be projected in the antecedent, for otherwise it wouldn’t occur under ellipsis, which it must do, given that it has moved into the higher CP position. Such reasoning is no good.

As Schaffer (ibid., p. 201) readily concedes, sluicing allows for adjuncts to move into CP position:

(32)a Pam ate, but [CP when [TP Pam ate <when>]]
   b Pam ate, but [CP where [TP Pam ate <where>]]
   c Pam ate, but [CP why [TP Pam ate <why>]]

If sluicing were a test that confirmed the presence of an experiencer argument for PPTs, it would equally confirm that every predicate projects arguments for time, place, purpose, and manner. The test is therefore useless to distinguish arguments from adjuncts. Still, Schaffer (op cit.) concludes:

   Overall, sluicing constructions seem to diagnose the prospect of either arguments or optional adjuncts. So the same confound recurs here from the licensing test, in that… [(30a) may be regarded as a case of sluicing] targeting an optional adjunct. But, given the argument above that experiencer phrases are not adjuncts, this confound is already resolved.

   The reasoning here is that since the binding and control tests are positive for the experiencer phrase being an argument, the licensing and sluicing tests can be resolved positively too: they test for arguments or adjuncts; since the latter disjunct does not hold, the first does. This argument is not invalid, but it is hardly compelling, since all the tests are equivocal, at best, and none of them serve to establish the experiencer phrase as possessing the same status as the paradigmatic arguments occurring in the examples employed to establish that the tests are good ones in the first place. One might equally well throw out the licensing and sluicing tests, for it is a tautology that the experiencer phrase is either an argument or an adjunct.

   Further, consider Schaffer (op cit.) general conclusion:

   All four of the diagnostics I have invoked—binding, licensing, control, and sluicing—have converged on the claim that taste predicates project experiencer arguments. This is a best-case result… Anytime there is a taste predicate, there is an experiencer specified, even if only covertly.

   This conclusion is at best overstated. The tests do not converge at all. As just noted, the licensing and sluicing tests might as well be thrown out, the latter being entirely empty. The control test is equivocal and cannot, anyway, be fully explanatory of the contrasts between control-like readings and generic-type readings. As for the binding test, I think that it simply does not offer a test for a covert position, for all of the relevant readings can be explained by quantifier interaction. The matter there reduces to whether to treat the PPTs as monadic or dyadic, which is just the initial problem. The binding test offers a way of restating the options, but not of resolving them. The standing of Schaffer’s conclusion considerably worsens when other tests he neglects to discuss are assessed. We find here a convergence in the other direction.

   3: Other syntactic considerations for a syntactically projected experiencer
In this section, I shall consider four further conditions that we might apply to test whether experiencer phrases are adjuncts or arguments. Just one of these tests is equivocal; the others, I think, give clear results in the negative. I’ll discuss the negative ones first.

3.1: Floating
Adjuncts can float within their clause in a way arguments cannot; in particular, adjuncts can extend maximal projections:

(33)a Billy plays football on Tuesdays  
  b Billy on Tuesdays plays football  
  c On Tuesdays, Billy plays football  
  d *Billy plays on Tuesdays football

Arguments can topicalise, of course (Football, Billy plays), but I assume that this is a case of movement to a Topic projection, which is only witnessed in (33c). Experiencer phrases patently float, even when the PPT takes a complement:

(34)a Liquorice is tasty for me  
  b Liquorice for me is tasty  
  c For me, liquorice is tasty

(35)a Roller coasters are fun for me to ride on  
  b Roller coasters for me are fun to ride on  
  c For me, roller coasters are fun to ride on  
  d *Roller coasters are fun to ride on for me

I cannot readily imagine an explanation for why a would-be covert argument of a predicate may be overtly realised upon any maximal projection within the clause that contains the predicate. There is no mystery here at all, if the experiencer phrases are adjuncts.

3.2: Ellipsis
As discussed with reference to weather reports (chapter bn), predicates and their (internal) arguments may undergo ellipsis, but a verb without its arguments may not. Adjuncts, on the other hand, can be stranded or substituted:

(36)a Billy drinks wine on Wednesdays, but doesn’t on Thursdays  
  b Billy drinks wine on Wednesdays, and Sally does too  
  c *Billy drinks wine on Wednesdays, but doesn’t beer on Thursdays  
  d *Billy drinks wine on Wednesdays, and Sally does wine too

The data here clearly tell us that wine is an argument of drink and on Wednesdays/Thursdays are adjuncts. So, if an experiencer phrase is an adjunct, we predict that it may be stranded or substituted without producing unacceptability; otherwise, the phrase appears to be an argument. Thus:

(37)a Liquorice is tasty for me, but isn’t for Sally  
  b Liquorice is tasty for me, and aniseed is too  
  c Roller coasters are fun for me to ride on, but aren’t for Sally  
  d Roller coasters are fun for me to ride on, and donkeys are too
For \( x \) behaves here as an adjunct.

Something else merits notice. The elision of the experiencer phrase in (37a) and (37c) produces a certain semantic effect, almost as if a contradiction is being made:

(38)a #Liquorice is tasty, but isn’t for Sally
   
   b #Roller coasters are fun to ride on, but aren’t for Sally

It is not clear what, if anything, one should conclude from this. What is suggested, though, is that if there is an experiencer argument, its value is not default-set to the speaker or addressee or some salient person, for if it were, there would be no anomalous effect with (38). It appears, therefore, as if the understood experiencer is generic or indefinite, which is predicted by the account offered above that the PPTs are simple predicates of the events semantically implying indefinite or generic participants of events.

A further bit of evidence in favour of this reading is a similarity between PPTs and generics in relation to specified exceptions (see chapter cbcb for further discussion).

(39)a Mosquitos carry malaria
   
   b Tigers have four legs
   
   c Paperbacks are cheap

The cases in (39) are construed as generic predications in part because they appear to accept exceptions; that is, all may remain true, even if not every value of the subject satisfies the predicate. Such is why generics are thought not to be equivalent to universals. Note, though, that the specification of an exception produces a certain oddity:

(40)a #Mosquitos carry malaria, but this one doesn’t
   
   b #Tigers have four legs, but this one hasn’t
   
   c #Paperbacks are cheap, but this one isn’t

Put otherwise, the actual specification of an exception to a generic appears to invite a quantification or retraction of the original generic claim, even if the claim by itself is not construed as a universal. This patterns PPTs with generic predicates, and so dissociates PPTs with predicates whose argument values are fixed contextually to the speaker, addressee, or an otherwise salient individual (see below).

3.3: Movement

As discussed in chapter xbcn, the possibility of long and short construals of moved \( wh \)-items appears to offer a test to differentiate arguments from adjuncts. Glanzberg (2007, p. 11, n. 9) suggests such an extraction test for predicates of PPTs. Consider the following pair:

(41)a ?Who do you wonder whether John kissed?
   
   b *Where do you wonder whether John kissed Mary?

Glanzberg’s judgements (as indicated) are as follows. (41a) is marginal, but acceptable to some, with \( who \) being construed as questioning the object position of kiss. Who, therefore, is an argument moved from the theme position of kiss.23 (41b) is unacceptable, with \( where \) being moved from an adjunct position on the complement, for the object position of kiss is occupied, so can’t be the launch site of \( where \).24 The basic thought, therefore, is that adjuncts and arguments differ in terms of their movement potential. As we shall see, the detail matters,
though. Applying the test to an overt experiencer, we have the following (again, Glanzberg’s judgements are indicated):

(42)a ??Who/to whom do you wonder whether sushi is tasty (to)?
b ??Who/for whom did Mary wonder whether the ride was fun (for)?

Glanzberg’s thought here is that if the higher wh-items are adjuncts, then the pair in (42) should be unacceptable to the same degree as (41b), for in all three cases, ex hypothesis, there are no unoccupied argument positions from which the wh-items might have moved and so they are obliged to have a long construal modifying the complement of wonder, which is ruled out in the case of (41b). If, on the other hand, who(m) is an argument in (42), then the pair should be at worst marginal along the lines of (41a), with who(m) being moved from the experiencer position of tasty/fun, much as who is moved from the theme object position of kiss in (41a). As it is, Glanzberg (op cit.) notes:

Some informants find cases like these [(42)] outright unacceptable…, while some find them marginal. The test is difficult to apply in practice, as it calls for differential judgements between argument and adjunct extractions, but predicts that both should be at least somewhat degraded. And of course, there may be any number of factors involved beyond argument/adjunct asymmetry in these cases.

The trouble to which Glanzberg’s is here alluding is that the constructions presented exhibit ‘weak island’ effects brought about by wonder selecting an interrogative complement headed by a wh-item. The difficulty with making sense of the significance of (42), however, is worse than that, I think, for Glanzberg has misrepresented the data.

The island effect is clear in the case of (41b), which readily has a reading, albeit an odd one, where it is the location of the wondering that is being asked for, rather than the location of the kissing. The former reading doesn’t involve an island violation, for the adjunct is moved from a position adjoined to wonder outside of the complement. Pace Glanzberg, therefore, the relevant datum here is not that (41b) is unacceptable, but that it does not possess a long construal, with the location of the kissing being asked for. The * for (41b) is undeserved and irrelevant, anyway. The real contrast is that a long construal in (41a) is more acceptable than in (41b), and it is such a difference that identifies the adjunct in (41b) by way of its acceptable short construal. I think, therefore, that the kind of data appealed to in order to motivate minimal or ECP violations holding for adjuncts but not (object) arguments is clear enough despite the ‘differential judgements’ between not wholly acceptable constructions: (41) offers a case in point. So, Glanzberg is wrong: it is not so much that (42) is confusing because it probes for graded judgements between unaccepatable sentences, for (41) does that too, but that (42) is more confusing than (41), even though both pairs are supposed to exhibit the same effect.

Controlling for the island effect can be achieved by simply substituting a declarative complement with a corresponding change of verb for the interrogative complement, say, replacing wonder whether with think. Making such a change, however, erases all differences between the cases, as one removes the ECP-effect too that pertains to the adjuncts. (41a) becomes perfectly OK, for its only problem was the island effect. (41b), per the reformulation, strikes me as ambiguous:

(43) Where do you think John kissed Mary?

The location of the thinking or the kissing can be here being questioned given the removal of the island. That indicates, of course, that where is an adjunct, which we knew, anyway. The suitable reformulations of (42) tell us nothing, I fear, for arguments and adjuncts can move
equally under such conditions. To be sure, the movement creates no ambiguity here but that is for independent reasons (prepositional stranding indicates the launch site of the movement and verbs like think don’t support the intended experiencer modification). One might seek to control the cases further by removing the stranding and using a verb that does support an experiencer modification:

(44)a To whom does it seem that sushi is tasty?
   b For whom does it seem that the ride is fun?

The question here is whether both cases support readings where the experiencer of the seeming or the experiencer of the tasty sushi/fun ride is being questioned. If so, then the moved item behaves like an adjunct. I think the pair in (44) do support such readings, although, of course, the natural reading for both is one where there is one experiencer for whom it only seems that sushi is tasty or the ride is fun, i.e., the movement would not be from the would-be argument position of tasty/fun, but from an adjunct position on the verb seem, with the complement providing the content of the experience. Still, imagine a parent anxiously observing their toddler on a ride, trying to judge whether the ride is fun for their precious offspring. In such a scenario, one could use (44b) and be coherently answered with ‘the parent’ or ‘the toddler’ (I’ll leave it to the reader to formulate the relevant scenario for (44a)). So much indicates that the moved phrases are adjuncts, even where we take the movement as being from the complement predicate, precisely because such a launch site for the phrase is not necessary, which it would be, were it an argument position.

In sum, then, the right diagnosis of the confusion engendered by (42) is that the moved wh-items are adjuncts, but they lack a short construal, for wonder does not support the relevant modification. Such is why they are pretty marginal at best. If we select a matrix verb that does support the relevant modification and so supports a short construal, then the wh-items can be happily read as adjuncts, with the long construal being blocked by ECP or whatever generalisation holds in this area. So, once we cut away various confounds, it seems to me that the extraction test, if pointing any way, points against PPTs possessing covert arguments.

3.4: Crossover effects
Stanley (2000) appeals to crossover effects as a diagnostic for overt items. Such effects, recall, are when a joint construal of a moved item (wh or quantifier) and a pronoun it moves over (hence, crossover) are excluded (the effect is ‘weak’ if the pronoun does not c-command the launch site, and ‘strong’ if it does). Lasersohn (2005, p. 681) offers the following cases to test for the effect, where a wh-item crosses over the position of a putative experiencer argument (parallel cases can easily be constructed for tasty):

(45)a Who was upset that the ride wasn’t fun?
   b Whom did the fact that the ride wasn’t fun upset?

(46)a Who was upset that the ride wasn’t fun for him?
   b ? Whom did the fact that the ride wasn’t fun for him upset?

Lasersohn argues as follows. There is no crossover in the a-cases, so their acceptability is OK for everyone. (45b) is equally predicted to be OK, if we hypothesise fun not to project an argument, for even though the wh-item launches from the object position of upset, it does not, ex hypothesi, crossover an item jointly construed with the wh-item. So, the acceptability of (45b) would suggest that there is no crossover effect. If we hypothesise that fun does project
an argument, then we should predict at least an effect of the kind witnessed in (46b), where the experiencer is overt, holding for (45b) too.

I share Lasersohn’s judgements on these cases. It seems to me, though, that a defender of covert experiencer arguments of PPTs shouldn’t appeal to crossover effects. The status and explanation of crossover effects is somewhat fraught, and, as classically understood, pertains to linearity effects, which would be impossible to detect for covert cases. Furthermore, it seems to me that the supposedly illicit reading of (46b) is not so bad, whereas if we were appealing to the overt case to tell us about the covert case, we should want a stronger indicator of illicitness. Indeed, if we move away from wh-cases to quantifiers, it is hard to detect any effect:

(47)a Every boy was upset that the ride wasn’t fun
   b The fact that the ride wasn’t fun upset every boy

(48)a Every boy was upset that the ride wasn’t fun for him/them
   b The fact that the ride wasn’t fun for him/them upset every boy

In both of the b-cases, one can construe the object quantifier phrase to take wide scope over the position of the experiencer (would-be overt in (47b), overt in (48b)), such that every boy didn’t have fun and was upset.

So, if there were some definite crossover effect for PPTs, then it would be good news for the advocate of covert experiencer arguments, but the test in general is somewhat unreliable, being marginal in the wh-case and non-existent in the quantifier case: the absence of the effect is of no great import.

4: Other considerations: clausal selection and generic operator binding
The moral of the forgoing considerations is that there is no good basis for thinking that PPTs syntactically project an experiencer/judge argument. The provision of such a participant in events PPTs describe appears to be delivered by an optional syntactic adjunct. Still, there may be reasons independent of general diagnostics for argument-hood to think that PPTs essentially carry an experiencer/judge projection. I shall consider two arguments to such an effect. The first bears on the selection properties of certain verbs. The second concerns generic binding.

(a) Verb selection. Verbs that take clausal complements select for certain clause types. Know takes declarative and interrogative complements, both finite and non-finite. Believe and other related ‘truth-aiming’ verbs are far more restrictive, only taking declarative finite clauses. Wonder and other interrogative verbs take finite and non-finite interrogative clauses. Other verbs, such as find, think, reckon, and consider take finite and non-finite declarative clauses as well as small clauses, as in Bill found/considered Sam stupid. Let’s say that these ‘other’ verbs, the small clause selecting ones, express opinion or at least support such a construal.26 Given such a categorisation, one may reason as follows. If verbs select for kinds of complements, and there are opinion-expressing verbs, then we may predict that the clauses the verbs select are expressions of opinion or matters of subjectivity. If such verbs select PPT-featuring clauses, then the prediction appears confirmed, and a natural explanation of the basis of the opinion-character of the clause is that it features an experiencer/judge projection (Stephenson, 2007; Lasersohn, 2005, 2009; Sæbø, 2009; Moltmann, 2010a, 2012; and Pearson, 2013). The crucial issue, of course, is whether the relevant verbs do select for expressions of opinion, which is somehow linguistically encoded independent of the verb. Some data appear to indicate this. Just consider find, which offers perhaps the best case (if the
argument doesn’t hold for *find*, we should hardly expect to hold for *think* or *consider*, where analogous data is much less striking):

(49)a Bill finds ice cream tasty/rollercoasters fun  
  b #Bill finds Sam tall/10st/a man

The thought here is that the difference between such cases, and so what explains the anomaly, is that *find* only takes clauses that express matters of opinion. A person’s dimensions or gender are not matters of opinion, whereas ice cream being tasty or rollercoasters being fun is mere opinion. Thus, it seems as if some clauses, qua selected by certain verbs, are inherently expressions of opinion, which would be explained were PPTs that form such clauses project an experiencer. I think this argument is no good at all. I shall first show that the data do not suggest that there is any subjective or opinion-expressing clause. Furthermore, the idea is theoretically incoherent, at least as presented above. This will lead to a consideration of the account of Moltmann (2010a, 2012) and Pearson (2013), which has the theoretical resources to overcome the problem, but the solution fails for independent reasons.

The first thing to note is that the deviance of (49b) is much less severe than other cases of clause selection violation:

(50)a *Bill knows Sam stupid  
  b *Sam wonders that the car is fixed  
  c *Sally finds if ice cream is tasty

So much tells us that clause selection is a syntactic condition, i.e., the clauses selected are not merely constrained to be the kind of clause that can express what is known, wondered, or found, but that this condition is encoded in the head of the clause as expressed by the functional C projection, or at least some definite functional projection on the left periphery of the clause. When we reflect on the kind of cases in (49b), it is relatively straightforward to imagine contexts where the deviance of the cases is ameliorated or just disappears. All we need do is think of a scenario where people are employing different standards or devices of measurement, and here we can find a kind of faultless disagreement or at least justified difference of opinion pretty much about the application of any predicate above and beyond tasty or fun. What this tells us is that it is the relevant verbs that impose a ‘matter of opinion’ construal on the clauses; the clauses themselves are neutral. This is further corroborated by the context-sensitivity of the construal of certain verbs in relation to their objects. Pederson (2012) offers the following case:

(51)a #Bill found that Sam won the race  
  b Bill found that Obama won the debate

The point here is that winning a race is not a mere matter of opinion in the way winning a debate plausibly is. On the face of it, though, there are no features that distinguish the pair of embedded clauses in (51), either by way of the interpretation of the lexical items (*win* is not ambiguous or relevantly polysemous) or a difference in functional/clausal projection.

If the above reasoning is anywhere near right, the argument we are entertaining is entirely back-to-front. The behaviour of *find* and related verbs in no way shows that clauses come marked as expressions of opinion in the same was as other clauses come marked as declarative or interrogative. Rather, it is the semantics of the verbs that indicate that the embedded clause is a matter of opinion. This is confirmed by the fact that more or less any clause of the right syntactic kind may be taken by the verbs. The resulting oddity of many
cases is simply due to the oddity involved in expression of an opinion about a matter that is not normally up for judgement or is otherwise definite. We can easily finagle cases, though, to make them much less degraded. The situation is very different where the selection is syntactic; no amount of contextual scene setting or substitution of lexical items can rescue (50) from flat-out unacceptability.

The above conclusion has clear empirical support. It is also theoretically sound. The argument we are considering reckons certain clauses to by typed as expressions of opinion or subjective, such is why only certain verbs select them. Assume, contrary to fact, that the facts were to support this claim. It would remain to be discovered how such putative clauses are typed as subjective/opinion. The projection of an experiencer argument cannot possibly fill this role, for clauses are not typed on the basis of their argument positions. Equally, therefore, even if the relevant verbs did only select opinions, whatever they might be, the case for experiencer projections would not be corroborated, for no such projection could identify a clause as subjective. Clauses are identified as of their kind, and so selected or not by clause-taking items, in virtue of their head, which is a complementiser (covert or overt), either occupying C position (or its SPEC) just above the TP or the highest position in the left periphery. Arguments cannot play such role. The bottom line here is that even if we might semantically type a predicate in terms of its holding or not being a matter of opinion, the clause that hosts such a predicate cannot be typed as an opinion clause in a way that will determine its selection, at least not if we are imagining such a determination to be akin to any known syntactic or semantic mechanism. Such selection properties as we find, therefore, hardly militate for an experiencer projection. As things stand, then, the argument under consideration is empirically mistaken and theoretically incoherent. There might, however, be other considerations that weigh in favour of the argument.

Moltmann (2006, 2010a, 2010b, 2012) takes arbitrary PRO to express ‘first-person-based genericity’, which means that, like one, arbitrary PRO is interpreted as being generically quantified over such that it designates everyone (admitting exceptions) relevantly similar to the speaker, minimally, all conscious persons. The relevance of this account to PPTs is twofold (cf. Pearson, 2013). Firstly, Moltmann (2010a, pp. 213-4; 2012, pp. 170-2) offers an argument based upon her account that argues in favour of an experiencer argument for PPTs. Secondly, the operator constitutive of Moltmann’s and Pearson’s analysis could perhaps serve as the head of a subjective/opinion clause. Let’s consider the argument first and then assess the position of the head.

The argument will be familiar from the above discussion of control phenomena. Consider the case in (51):

(51) It is fun to play football

Moltmann notes that the construction expresses a covariation between whoever has fun and whoever plays football. She proposes that this condition can be established as follows:

(52) [CP GNx [It is fun x [PROx to play football]]].

‘Gnx’ is a generic quantifier that binds the experiencer position of fun and the PRO position of the non-finite clause. In effect, for Moltmann, arbitrary PRO is always bound by such an operator in virtue of its equivalence to one, and it is precisely the presence of the operator that explains the covariation reading of (51). If all of this is right, then we also appear to get a nice consequence: the subjective/opinion clause might be headed by the kind of operator Moltmann and Pearson posit. I shall now reject this of reasoning.
First off, all by itself, the argument from covariation is not a good reason to posit an experiencer argument projection. It is persuasive only if one has already accepted the presence of the higher operator, whose occurrence explains the covariation in terms of operator scope. As explained above, though, the covariation can be accounted for without appeal to joint binding, i.e., without the positing of an argument position for the matrix PPT. It suffices if we merely let the PPT be a predicate of the non-finite clause. For the fun to be disjoint from the playing would, therefore, involve another predicate such that it is fun to be related to the playing of football by that predicate. This will not explain everything, why, for instance, *It is popular to dance* does not have a covariation reading. The explanation for that, though, follows from what it takes to be popular, which blocks the entailment to a token of the type (dancing in this case) being popular. That explanation does not require the positing of an extra argument for PPTs. Moreover, there is no independent syntactic reason to posit a Gn operator (more on this below). Since, in other words, we are not obliged to posit the operator and can explain the covariation phenomenon without it, that we can explain covariation phenomenon with the operator plus the experiencer argument hardly constitutes a good reason for positing the experiencer argument—a case of inference to the worst explanation.

Let us assume, however, that there is a syntactically realised Gn operator as the head of CP. Could this operator serve as the head that identifies clauses as expressions of opinion? In constructions such as (51), where there is an embedded arbitrary PRO, the proposal seems plausible. At least initially, the operator was posited to explain features of PRO, not PPTs *toute court*. So, while the operator might explain features of PPTs in interaction with PRO, it looks to be unavailable in the absence of PRO. Perhaps the proposal could be extended, however, so that any occurrence of a PPT projects an argument bound by a higher operator that gives a subjective generic-kind of reading to the experiencer similar to that which arbitrary PRO enjoys (cf., Pearson, 2013). There are problems with such a proposal.

Firstly, it is far from obvious where the Gn operator is supposed to sit in any of these accounts. Moltmann and Pearson assume that it is a C head. That can’t be right, however, for one can embed the relevant clauses under verbs with selection requirements that would compete with the putative Gn operator:

(52) Bill knows [that/Gn ice cream is tasty/it is fun to play football]

Here, Gn competes with *that* to be head of the clause. We might assume, then, as perhaps should be assumed anyway, that there is no unitary CP projection, but a structured left periphery that may host a range of functional elements. A Topic projection also competes with that, if CP is a unitary whole; it would be no cause for concern, if Gn was as disreputable as Topic (Rizzi, 1997; Haegeman, 2012). Questions now arise concerning the position of the operator in the left hierarchy and why it is essentially covert. However these questions might be answered, it is clear that the assumption that the Gn operator is a C head is mistaken.

Empirical problems also arise. The hypothesis that PPTs project first-person based generically bound arguments makes good sense of the semantics when no other scope-taking element is present. When some other such items are present, it is unclear how to understand the hypothesis. Consider:

(53)a Everyone finds ice cream tasty
   b (Every person *x*)[*x finds ice cream tasty for *x*]
Here, it appears as if the quantifier, as displayed in the reading provided, binds the experiencer position. Of course, I think the additional adjunct is not required, but my opponent should hardly think so, it being their very position that PPTs project experiencer arguments. The problem now, however, is that if experiencer positions are essentially generically bound, then they can’t be universally bound too, as they appear to be in (52). Obviously, the problem generalises to all bound readings that occur with PPTs.

I do not think the problems I have raised for the Moltmann-style position are decisive. The position has resources to handle many subtle phenomena, but I do not see how it can militate for experiencer projections, even if it gives a compelling reading of arbitrary PRO. Again, we have found no reason to think that selection properties support experiencer projections of PPTs.

5: Conclusion
PPTs present a range of philosophical problems beyond the question of whether or not they select experiencer arguments. If my forgoing considerations are on the right lines, then they do not select such arguments. That suffices for my negative purposes of showing that the predicates do not indicate variable involvement of the third grade; indeed, the reasons adduced for this conclusion are in line with the independent considerations for similar conclusions regarding weather reports and indefinites. To this extent, the three cases are mutually supporting and are predicted by the general considerations against syntax sanctioning variables that may be free or bound. As regards PPTs in particular, various options remain. As I indicated at the beginning, the arguments I have offered certainly defeat (or are intended to) one argument for a contextualist treatment of PPTs, an argument that seeks to tie the putative context-variant content of PPTs with the differing values of a syntactic variable. The contextualist, though, is not obliged to make such a strong commitment. As things stand, therefore, I remain neutral on how, if at all, relativism should be distinguished from contextualism. One option for the contextualist is to follow Neale (2007) on weather predicates as discussed in chapter (vbvn). The claim would now be that the experiencer of PPTs is semantically essential, but syntactically shows up as an optional adjunct. That is a position, but as mentioned in relation to weather predicates, the hypothesis is difficult to evaluate. To show that an item is a syntactic argument is to show that there is independent evidence for its thematic content being essential to the host predicate, i.e., independent of our intuitions about what would be involved in the relevant claims being true or false. Such truth-conditional intuitions are unreliable here because they don’t distinguish between semantic content proper and pragmatic effects, or saturation vs. enrichment. Yet to give up on a syntactic differentiation in terms of argument/adjunct is just to fall back on such intuitions about truth conditions, whose unreliability made so tempting the thought that PPT experiencers are realised syntactically as arguments. In short, talk of semantic arguments syntactically realised as adjuncts is just obscure without some independent evidence of what is involved in a feature being semantically essential but syntactically optional. In effect, the position is holding out for a linguistic difference that doesn’t have a structural effect.

Notes

1 See, for example, Epstein (1984), Condoravdi and Gawon (1996), and Bhatt and Pancheva (2006). The issue of covert projection of an experiencer clearly bears upon the more general
issue of the projection of implicit arguments as considered in chapter X. I shall take that
discussion as background for this chapter.

2 As before, I assume that adjuncts are essentially optional. There are marginal or
idiosyncratic cases of obligatory adjuncts, but such considerations do not bear upon the
predicates that concern us here. See Grimshaw and Vikner (1993) and Baker (2003) and
discussion in chapter xcx.

3 See Kölbl (2002, 2003). The notion of faultless disagreement is not essential to the dispute
between relativism and contextualism I am about to broach, but it is useful nonetheless (cf.,
Stojanovic, 2007; MacFarlane, 2007).

4 Stojanovic (2007) makes a good case for genuine disagreement being a matter where all
misunderstanding has been ruled out, where, say, both parties agree on who the relevant
judge of the matter should be. Be that as it may, my concern here is not to make ultimate
sense of disagreement, but only to inquiry into a potential linguistic basis for its realisation.

5 See Kölbl and Garcia-Carpintero (2009) for general discussion and articulation of varied
positions on the dispute. ‘Contextualism’ is perhaps not the happiest term for the position at
issue, for it is also used for positions that view content as pragmatically determined
independent of any specific linguistic license, ‘Indexicalism’ might be a better term, but I
bow to convention. Moreover, ‘contextualism’ appears often to be a label for the ‘standard’
or ‘received’ view without a proper specification of who the contextualists are; see Lasersohn
(2005, 2009) for an example of such usage. For present purposes, I take the contextualist to
be someone who holds that there is a specific linguistic license in the form of a variable for
the contextual determination of the linguistic content of PPT predicate tokens. See Richard
(2008) and Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009) for positions that do not easily fit within the
‘relativism vs. contextualism’ framing of the issues; neither, however, directly concern
themselves with the kind of linguistic argumentation offered by Glanzberg (2007), Schaffer
(2011) and other theorists.

6 Stojanovic (2007) argues that relativism and contextualism are notational variants, if strictly
construed as semantic claims, as opposed to claims about how values of linguistic items get
fixed. This seems right to me, but a wedge can be provided precisely on the basis of the
syntactic assumptions the contextualism is liable or happy to make, which the relativist may
demur without forfeit. See below.

7 Both relativist and contextualist, for instance, must treat the judge or experiencer position as
variable, insofar as PPTs are useable from different perspectives. I take it that the fixation on
the value of the variable is an issue for both sides. My concern below will be, in effect, just
for a particular strong version of the contextualism that treats the variable as syntactically
realised.

8 Binding theory has become an increasingly complex field since the development of the
classic position, with perhaps the central issue being whether binding is a mostly syntactic or
semantic phenomenon, or a single phenomenon at all; for example, see Safir (2004), Büring
(2005), Rooryck and Wyngaerd (2011) for overviews and assessments of recent
developments. As for Chomsky himself, he rejects classic binding theory, insofar as it
essentially involves indexes, which appear to contravene inclusiveness in not being items that
are lexically projected or first merged (Chomsky, 1995, 2000; Collins, 2007).

9 Here and below, I shall assume that such ambiguity is genuine. Note, though, that the two
readings offered are truth-conditionally equivalent. A case where there is at least one thing
such that everyone got it and found it tasty counts as a case where everyone got at least one
thing that was tasty for the individual, and vice versa (see Reinhart, 1997; Fox, 2000). To get
the intended ambiguity, one would need the stipulation that where there are different tasty
things, the children do not agree that the things they didn’t get are tasty too. That reading,
though, is not licensed by the semantic properties of the sentences; it seems, rather, to be due to a scalar effect on the existential that rules out there being more than one tasty thing. None of this, though, matters to my argument below, which turns on the ambiguity, should it be genuine, being an interaction of the quantifiers; if there is no genuine ambiguity, then there is no argument here to consider.

For present purposes, we may simply assume that fun is unique in its grammatical and semantic selection properties. At any rate, I can’t think of another English item that behaves like fun with respect to had and other environments. Bare fun in (9b) appears to be mass nominal such that everyone took part in some measure of the eventish stuff.

10 Epstein (1984) posits an experiencer covert item pro as an argument of the relevant predicates The item, however, is never free. It is either construed as a universal quantifier or referentially dependent on an antecedent. For present purposes, I have no argument with the kind of account Epstein offers, although see below for some critical comments.

11 As discussed in chapter vbvn, one can drop arguments in non-subject positions and sometimes add cognate objects with variable and complex results. The notion that predicates have a precise addict, therefore, is moot. It remains clear, though, that arguments do not iterate.

12 This is the chief moral of the ‘cartography’ project. See citations above.

13 Epstein (1984, p. 23) offers cases such as (i) as evidence for the presence of a covert experiencer argument:

(i) It is fun for Lucy for Joe to play baseball.

The idea here is that for Lucy overtly realises the argument role of fun, with what Lucy finds fun is Joe’s playing baseball. As with (16), though, it seems to me that one can get a reading where Joe finds it fun for Lucy to play baseball, with PRO arbitrary. That would indicate the possibility of an adjunct construal. Again, stacking the phrases up quickly leads to bizarreness.

14 PRO occurring in an arbitrary position may also be bound (Bill thought that PRO smoking was damaging to his health). The crucial fact is that here the control is non-obligatory.

15 It might be thought that if tasty does project an experiencer, then it should take a non-finite complement, much as fun, appear, frighten, etc. As it is, it does not, and (i) is pretty marginal:

(i) ?Liquorice is tasty for Sam to eat

I assume, however, that the grammatical selection properties (sub-categorisation) of predicates may diverge from their semantic properties.

17 Epstein (1984, p. 25, n. 5) correctly notes the kind of contrast between (22) and, say, *To play baseball is certain, and claims that the contrast shows that PRO must be controlled, the problem with the latter construction being that ‘there exists an uncontrolled, hence illicit, PRO’. Yet none of this explains how PRO can be syntactically controlled by the putative projected argument of the adjective fun in (22), which for Epstein is a pro item default interpreted as a universal quantifier, i.e., the would-be operator is not in a c-commanding position.

18 Moltmann (2006, 2010a, 2010b, 2012) and Pearson (2013) also argue for a particular generic construal of PRO that involves it being essentially bound. I shall discuss this position below. Much earlier, Epstein (1984) argued that arbitrary PRO should be understood as a bound item in the scope of a pro item projected by the experiencer adjective and construed as a universal quantifier. Epstein’s principal consideration is that (i) has the reading in (ii), not (iii):
(i) It is fun [PRO to play baseball]

(ii) \( (\forall x) [\text{It is fun for } x \text{ [PRO, to play baseball]}] \)

(iii) It is fun \( (\forall x) [\text{PRO, to play baseball}] \)

That is, (i) is a claim that everyone finds something fun, viz., playing baseball, not a claim that it would be fun for everyone to play baseball. This observation is clearly correct, but the distinction also holds on a generic reading of arbitrary PRO without the need to posit an extra item pro. Besides which, it seems mistaken to construe arbitrary PRO as a universal. Like other generic construals, the truth conditions of (i) readily admit exceptions. Bhatt and Pancheva (2006, p. 578) also regard arbitrary PRO as generic, but suggest that it supports a contextual reading too, where episodic. Thus:

(iv) This morning, it was difficult [PRO to dance the tango] since we were all hung over.

The natural reading here, though, does not refute the generic construal of arbitrary PRO but merely supplies the relevant dancers as we, which is not contextual, as far as I can see. This is supported by the fact that (iv) does possess a fully generic reading. Imagine that the value of we is some group who prepare the dance floor, but since they are all hung over, they have done a bad job, rending the dancing difficult to perform.

The issues here are sufficiently complex that no stronger claim would be appropriate. See chapter X for references on the control literature, and Landau (2008), in particular, for scepticism of the significance of backward control for the movement theory of control.

See Ross (1967) for the original discussion of sluicing and Merchant (2001) for an excellent contemporary discussion of the phenomenon and related matters.

I assume that the T head doesn’t move into the C head position in the lower clause.

Note that these constructions are quite distinct from those of the form of (i):
(i) Liquorice is tasty, but it isn’t for Sally
(i) could be true even if Sally thinks that liquorice is tasty; perhaps the problem with liquorice is that it gives her indigestion.

Following the standard GB explanation, we may take the marginal status of (41a) to be due to a subjacency (‘weak island’ in this case) violation, where the wh-item has moved from an indirect interrogative complement (see chapter vbvn for discussion). Glanzberg does not offer an explanation. See below.

Again, Glanzberg does not offer an explanation of the unacceptability, but I take him to be presuming that it is due to an ECP-like violation in addition to a subjacency violation, with where moving from the interrogative complement, with its lower trace or copy being blocked (not ‘properly governed’) by the wh-item intervening between the lower trace/copy and the higher copy/trace adjoined to wonder.

There is an issue here pertaining to the difference between movement from adjuncts and the movement of adjuncts, i.e., in the present case, whether or not the preposition to needs to move along with the wh-items. I assume that the illicitness or not of extraction from adjuncts is independent of the question whether the movement of adjuncts differs from that of arguments (see Stepanov, 2007).

Of course, this kind of categorisation has many exceptions and some cases cross-classify.

I have used the small clause construction, but the same affect holds with non-finite clauses, as with Bill finds Sam to be tall/10st/a man.