

THE GREAT DETOUR

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Roles, Reference, and Cognitive Significance

1. Review: E-conditions and O-conditions

- ▶ Claim: It is *episodes* — thoughts (in the ordinary sense) and utterances — that are true or false.
- ▶ Philosophers usually think of "truth-conditions" as what I call O-conditions, conditions on the things referred to, the properties and relations predicated.
- ▶ But we get to truth-conditions on objects, only by filling in values another kind of truth-conditions, conditions on the expressions used, which quantify over the objects referred to, predicated, etc. Or at least some of them. These I call E-conditions.

2. Example: Identity Statements

(A) Hesperus = Hesperus

(B) Hesperus = Phosphorus

Augmented E-conditions

(A) is true iff the object 'Hesperus' stands for that is identical with the object 'Hesperus' stands for.

(B) is true iff the object 'Hesperus' stands for is identical with the object 'Phosphorus' stands for.

We get, for free, the different truth-conditions for identity statements that Frege introduced the revisions in §8 of the *Begriffsschrift* to achieve. But we get them for free; they fall out of the semantics.

3. Plan

The goal is to understand the third of Frege's identity problems, from "The Thought".

But first,

- ▶ Try to understand modes of presentation and senses;
- ▶ Consider the structure of reference;
- ▶ Introduce a third level, U-conditions.

4. Senses and modes of presentation

It is natural, now, to think of there being connected with a sign (name, combination of words, letter), besides that to which the sign refers, which may be called the referent of the sign, also what I would like to call the sense of the sign, wherein the mode of presentation is contained. In our example, accordingly, the referents of the expressions "the point of intersection of a and b" and "the point of intersection of b and c" would be the same, but not their senses. The referent of "evening star" would be the same as that of "morning star," but not the sense.

5. Modes of Presentation and senses

When we think of demonstratives and indexicals, it is natural to distinguish modes of presentation and senses.

[A.] The Mode of Presentation:

- ▶ The relation the the episode of reference (U) has to the object referred to.
- ▶ Established (more or less) by the conventions of the language involved.
- ▶ May involve objects that play important *utterance-relative roles*: speaker-of, time-of, location-of.
- ▶ Or the mode of presentation may simply provide a property sufficient for being the referent that does not vary from utterance to utterance. For example
- ▶ An utterance of 'Canada' refers to Canada.

6. Modes of Presentation and senses

B. The Sense:

Conditions that uniquely identify the referent.

E.g. *Being the largest and best educated country in North America, as of 2016*, identifies Canada.

E.g. *Being the person Perry pointed to at 11:45 on June 21, 2016* identifies Francois Recanati.

7. A general purpose account of reference

- ▶ An utterance u in language L refers to x if
 - ▶ $\exists E$, E is the expression of u &
 - ▶ $\exists S$, S is the speaker of u &
 - ▶ $\exists T$, T is the time of u &
 - ▶ $\exists Lo$, Lo is the location of u & ...

8. A general purpose account of reference

- ▶ $\exists MP^*, MP^* =$ the set of modes of pres. allowed for E by L &
- ▶ $\exists MP, MP =$
the mode of presentation associated by S at T with E &
- ▶ $\exists y(MP(S, T) = y)$ &
- ▶ $x = y$

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10. Automatic Indexicals.

By an "automatic indexical", I mean that reference is determined by the lexicon plus the values of the utterance roles, *speaker and time (and location)*.

So we really have a new bottom level: U-conditions.

An utterance has five roles: language, expression, speaker, time, and location. If we have the expression and the language, then we may have U-conditions, conditions on the *utterance*. This is what happens with automatic indexicals.

11. Automatic Indexicals

The only true automatic indexical seems to be "I".

"Today", "Tomorrow" and "Yesterday" come close, if we disregard time zones.

The referent of an automatic indexical does not depend on speaker intentions, informational chains, etc.

12. "The Thought" Quote Again

From "The Thought" (1918-19), p. 131 in the Quintons' *Mind* translation, 1956.

If someone wants to say the same today as he expressed yesterday using the word "today", he must replace this word with "yesterday". Although the thought is the same its verbal expression must be different so that the sense, which would otherwise be affected by the differing times of utterance, is re-adjusted. The case is the same with words like "here" and "there". In all such cases the mere wording, as it is given in writing, is not the complete expression of the thought, but the knowledge of certain accompanying conditions of utterance, which are used as means of expressing the thought, are needed for its correct apprehension. The pointing of fingers, hand movements, glances may belong here too. The same utterance containing the word "I" will express different thoughts in the mouths of different men, of which some may be true, others false.

13. Handling (Automatic) Indexicals

- (E) Today be warm (uttered May 28)
- (F) Yesterday be warm (uttered May 29)

Lexical facts: An utterance of 'today' refers to the day the utterance is made; a use of 'yesterday' to the day before it is made. Lexical facts do *not* fix the reference of indexicals.

U-conditions: Given the compositional and lexical facts we have **different** U(tterance) conditions:

(E) is true iff the day on which (E) was made be warm (condition on the utterance E);

(F) is true iff the day before (F) was made be warm (condition on the utterance (F)).

14. O-conditions

Given, in addition, the reference-fixing facts — that (E) was uttered May 28, and (F) May 29 — we have

(E) is true iff May 28 be warm

(F) is true if May 29 be warm

The O-conditions for (E) and (F) are the **same**; that is, the truth of (E) and (F) require the same thing.

Moral: For automatic indexicals, difference in cognitive significance comes out at level of U-conditions.

15. Discretionary Reference

The reference of demonstratives, and most indexicals depend on facts in addition to the time, location, and the speaker, such as the intentions of the speaker, demonstrations and the like.

Lexical Facts (somewhat oversimplified): An utterance of 'that F' refers to the salient F the speaker intends to talk about.

16. The battleship

Situation: Long ship with middle obscured by building.

(H) That ship is that ship

Given Fred is the speaker of (H)

S-conditions:

(H) is true if $\exists x, y$ Fred demonstrates x with the first 'That ship' and y with the second 'that ship' and $x = y$.

(H) will be trivial if the two demonstrations could not have been two different ships, informative if they could have been.

Applications

Situation: Heimson is an amnesiac who decides he must be Bob Dylan.

(8) I wrote “Blowin’ in the Wind” in 1962.

(9) Bob Dylan wrote “Blowin’ in the Wind” in 1962; Heimson did not.

(10) I am the speaker of (8) and (9);

(11) Dylan is the speaker of (8) and (9)

(12) Heimson is not the speaker of (8) and (9)

Moral: To understand the possibility, we need to consider the U-conditions.

Applications

Situation: Today is October 12. If I tell you (14) you will definitely get yourself in front of a TV at 7 p.m.

(13) The Giants play St. Louis on October 12 at 7 p.m.

(14) The Giants play St. Louis today at 7 p.m.

(14S) (14) is true iff there is a day to which Bill refers with 'today', at **t** and the Giants play St. Louis on that day.

(14E) (14) is true iff (14) occurs at a time such that the referent of 'today' at that time is a day on which the Giants play St. Louis.

Moral: it is the U-conditions that explain the difference in cognitive significance.