THE GREAT DETOUR

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June 22, 2016
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How About That-clauses?

(1) Trump loses the election.

(1) is an utterance of an English sentence of the type indicated. Given that, *what else* has to be the case for (1) to be true?

$\exists S, T, L$ such that

$S =$ the speaker of (1) &
$T =$ the time of (1) &
$L =$ the location of (1) & ...

As long these objects are only identified by reference to the utterance (1), the truth-conditions we give are *U-conditions* or *utterance-bound* conditions.

2. Reviewing The Basic Idea: E(xpression) Conditions

Then, still within the scope of those existential quantifiers, we continue...

...

    $\exists x, y, \phi$ such that:

    S refers to x at T with 'Trump' &

    S refers to y at T with 'the election' &

    S refers to ϕ at T with 'wins' & ...

... introducing expression-roles like *refers to* and *predicates*. If the utterance roles are filled, but these are not, then we have *E-conditions* or *expression-bound* conditions.

3. Reviewing Basic Idea: O(bject) Conditions

Once we have identified the values of the utterance roles, and the values of the expression, we will have identified the objects referred to as Trump and the 2016 U.S.A. Presidential election, and the relation predicated as losing. Given that, *what else* has to be the case, for (1) to be true?

Trump loses the 2016 U.S.A. Presidential election.

These are the O-conditions of (1).

4. Cognitive Significance

Thus an utterance has a great many truth-conditions, depending on what we quantify over and what we instantiate.

My claim is that among this plethora of truth-conditions, or the propositions we might use to keep track of them, we can find what we need to pin point the differences in cognitive significance among different utterances with the same O-conditions. We can solve Frege's identity problems without resort and special treatment of identity sentences, or any notion of Sinne that goes beyond what is provided by the account of truth-conditions.

5. Gedanken and That-clauses

We also do not need Frege's Gedanken, or their modern descendants, and should give up the whole picture of the propositional attitudes as relations to abstract objects that are somehow grasped by the mind.

Many of the issues arise with "X says that S". So today we will see if we can get by without Gedanken for Indirect Discourse Reports.

Reminder of Frege's views about that-clauses propositional attitudes and direct discourse:

- ▶ The embedded sentence refers to its usual sense (a Gedanke, if the sentence is complete);
- ▶ These Gedanke will be determined by the senses of the words in the sentence, not by the references of the words.
- ▶ Propositional attitudes are relations to these Gedanke, such as believing, hoping, etc.

6. Gedanken and that-clauses

- ▶ This Gedanke will not have any concrete objects as parts or aspects;
- ▶ A Gedanke will be true or false irregardless of the agent or time.
- ▶ The Gedanke gets as the *cognitive significance* of the belief or other attitude reported.

7. Examples

I'll focus on some examples.

    Trump: Hilary said that I am an idiot.

    Me: Conan Doyle said that Sherlock Holmes lived in London.

    FBI man: Ralph said that Ortcutt was a spy.

8. Samesaying

My approach is sort of like Davidson's in "On Saying That". Samesaying is a relation between utterances (more or less). A that-clause is an utterance of (but not an assertion of) the embedded sentence (more or less). If the embedded sentence "samesays" with the reported on utterance, the report is true.
But what is the samesaying relation?

9. Trump and Hillary

Hillary: "Donald Trump is an idiot"

Hillary: "Ted Cruz is an idiot"

Trump: Hillary said that I am an idiot.

- ▶ Trump's report is a true report about Hillary's first utterance, but not her second.
- ▶ It seems that Hilary's utterance and Trump's that-clause have the same O-conditions, that Trump is an idiot.

10. Trump and Hillary

- They do not have the same E-conditions; the truth of Hillary's remark requires that her use of "Trump" refers to an idiot, while the truth of his embedded sentence requires that his use of "I" refers to an idiot.
- They do have the same augmented O-conditions, where the conditions quantify over the speaker, the augmentation supplies the words "am an idiot" but not the words "Hillary" and "I". Then both require that the speaker of the utterance refer to someone who is an idiot.
- But that doesn't suffice for samesaying, or else Trump's report would be a correct report of Hillary's first remark.

11. Doyle and Holmes

Conan Doyle: Sherlock Holmes lived in London.

Me: Conan Doyle said that Sherlock Holmes lived in London.

Me: Conan Doyle said that Nero Wolfe lived in London.

Me: Conan Doyle said that Watson's roomate lives in London.

- ▶ My first remark is true, the second one false, the third not so clear.
- ▶ There is no Sherlock Holmes. So neither of Doyle's utterance nor the that-clause in my remark have O-conditions.
- ▶ That similarity isn't enough for samesaying, or else my second remark would be true, since there is also no Nero Wolfe.

12. Doyle and Holmes

Doyle's utterance and my that-clause have the same augmented U-conditions, with all the referents filled in except for that of "Holmes":

$\exists S, T$ S is the speaker of u and T is the time of u &

... S refers to London with "London" at T & ... &

$\exists x$ such that S at T refers to x with "Holmes" &

x lives in London.

13. Results so far

[Trump case] Having the same O-conditions is sufficient for samesaying, but not necessary;

[Holmes case] Having the same (augmented) U-conditions is sufficient for samesaying, but not necessary.

14. Ralph and Ortcutt

Ralph sees his neighbor Ortcutt on the beach, giving and obvious Bolshevik a satchel labelled "CIA Secrets." He doesn't realize that it is Ortcutt. Both the FBI man and Ralph are on the beach. The FBI man is reporting to his superior.

(R1) Ralph: That man is a spy

(R2) Ralph: Ortcutt is not a spy

FBI agent:

Ralph said:

(F1) that Ortcutt is a spy

(F2) that Ortcutt is not a spy

(F3) that that man is a spy

(F4) that that man is not a spy

15. Ralph and Ortcutt

*(F1) is a true report of (R1); they have the same O-conditions.
But they do not have the same augmented U-conditions, since the
singular terms are different.

(F2) is a true report of (R2); they have the same O-conditions and the
same augmented U-conditions. No Buts.

(F3) is a true report of (R1); they have the same O-conditions and the
same augmented U-conditions. No Buts.

*(F4) is a true report of (R2); they have the same O-conditions. **But** they
do not have the same augmented U-conditions.

16. Ralph and Ortcutt

In the case of the starred items we can either:

- ▶ Bite the Bullet (Barwise and Perry, Soames, Salmon)
- ▶ Use the Crimmins-Perry strategy.

In that latter case, there is an unarticulated constituent (part of the given) in the F1 case reporting R1.

And similarly with the use of F4 to report R2.