



Patrick Haggard

Patrick Haggard est Professeur en neurosciences cognitives à l'Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience à University College London. Après un doctorat sur la coordination visuomotrice à Cambridge en 1991 et un post-doctorat sur la volonté à Oxford, il fut l'un des pionniers de la recherche sur le sens de l'agentivité proposant un cadre théorique qui s'appuie sur le principe du « liage intentionnel ». Il a ainsi montré que l'intervalle temporel entre une action et ses conséquences est perçu comme plus court lorsque l'action est intentionnelle et qu'on en est l'auteur. Patrick Haggard fut aussi parmi les premiers à étudier scientifiquement la représentation du corps propre, s'intéressant aussi bien aux illusions corporelles qu'aux mécanismes multisensoriels et à la douleur. Ses travaux les plus récents concernent le libre arbitre et le sens de la responsabilité. Patrick Haggard est membre de la British Academy.

Sélection bibliographique

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- 2015 Khalighinejad, N., Haggard, P. Modulating human sense of agency with non-invasive brain stimulation. *Cortex*, 69, 93-103.
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- 2015 Mancini, F., Steinitz, H., Steckelmacher, J., Iannetti, G.D., Haggard, P. Poor judgment of distance between nociceptive stimuli. *Cognition*, 143, 41-47.
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- 2005 Calvo-Merino B., Glaser D.E., Grezes J., Passingham R.E. & Haggard P. Action observation and acquired motor skills: an fMRI study with expert dancers. *Cerebral Cortex*, 15, 1243-1249.
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Conférences Jean-Nicod 2016

Volition, agency, responsibility: cognitive mechanisms of human action

Conférence du 17 mai *Human volition*

Voluntary action is central to our views of human nature, but eludes scientific investigation. Philosophers sometimes define voluntary actions as actions which are reasons-responsive, or are "up to us". In contrast, neuroscientists often consider voluntary actions as involving a specific set of brain pathways that lead to movement. In particular, brain science distinguishes between movements that are externally-triggered, such as reflex responses, and those that are internally-generated. This lecture considers what this capacity for internally-generated movement might mean, what basis it might have in the human brain, and how it relates to our conscious experience of our own actions.

Conférence du 20 mai *The sense of agency*

Our actions often aim at producing some specific goal event or outcome. The mental capacity to link actions to outcomes is a distinctive feature of human cognition, and is accompanied by a distinctive experience, which I call "sense of agency". Measuring the sense of agency is difficult. The brain readily tags the outcomes of our own actions – as our ability to control devices and machines clearly shows. However, people generally overestimate the influence of their actions, leading to some interesting illusions of agency. I will describe one method of measuring sense of agency, based on a Humean notion of the human mind. In the "intentional binding" effect, people perceive their voluntary actions and the outcomes of those actions, as linked together in time, so that the interval between them is subjectively compressed.

Conférence du 24 mai *Narrative confabulation, or prospective control*

This lecture investigates the mechanisms and impacts of human sense of agency. The methods of mental chronometry, and in particular the intentional binding measure, have made it possible to study the causes and consequences of sense of agency in the controlled conditions of the experimental laboratory. Is the sense of agency a purely retrospective narrative, driven by the mind's attempts to make sense of actions? Or is it a prospective perception of impending goal-directed voluntary action. Current evidence suggests our experience of agency reflects a balance of both prospective and retrospective processes. Neuroscientific evidence from brain measurements and brain stimulation suggest a model in which the frontal lobes prepare an experience of agency as part of action preparation, while the parietal lobes monitor the outcomes of voluntary actions.

Conférence du 27 mai *Responsibility for action*

Many systems of law involve a 'voluntary act condition' for criminal responsibility. More generally, society holds individuals responsible for their voluntary actions, because it views each individual as an agent governed by conscious free will, who 'could have done otherwise'. How can we establish whether an action is voluntary or involuntary? I will consider neuropsychological evidence from two specific examples: actions made under conditions of strong emotion, and actions made under coercion. In both cases, the brain mechanisms that generate the subjective experience of controlling our own actions turn out to have major implications for personal responsibility, and thus for the organisation of our societies.

VOLITION, AGENCY, RESPONSIBILITY: COGNITIVE
MECHANISMS OF HUMAN ACTION

P. HAGGARD

Mardi 17 mai de 14h30 à 16h30

HUMAN VOLITION

École normale supérieure, Salle Jean Jaurès
29, rue d'Ulm, 75005 Paris.

Remise du Prix Jean-Nicod et cocktail après la conférence.

Vendredi 20 mai de 14h30 à 16h30

THE SENSE OF AGENCY

École normale supérieure, Salle Jean Jaurès
29, rue d'Ulm, 75005 Paris.

Mardi 24 mai de 14h30 à 16h30

NARRATIVE CONFABULATION, OR PROSPECTIVE CONTROL

École normale supérieure, Salle Jean Jaurès
29, rue d'Ulm, 75005 Paris.

Vendredi 27 mai de 14h30 à 16h30

RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION

École normale supérieure, Salle Dussane
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philosophie cognitive

Conférences Jean-Nicod de

L'esprit humain, son organisation, sa nature, ses relations avec le corps et avec le monde sont depuis toujours parmi les thèmes centraux de la philosophie. La psychologie contemporaine elle-même a pris naissance au sein de la philosophie. Elle s'est émancipée, mais l'émergence des sciences cognitives consacre d'une certaine façon le retour de la philosophie dans ce champ de recherche. Les développements de l'informatique et des neurosciences, en jetant une nouvelle lumière sur les phénomènes mentaux, ont eu pour effet de relancer le débat philosophique. La « philosophie de l'esprit » est ainsi plus florissante que jamais. Ce retour n'a rien d'une régression, car la philosophie dont il est question est en phase avec la recherche scientifique, informée par elle et en constante interaction avec elle.

Les Conférences Jean-Nicod visent à promouvoir les recherches philosophiques se rapportant à la cognition et à faire connaître en France les travaux réalisés à l'étranger dans ce domaine. Le conférencier présente ses recherches au cours d'un cycle de conférences qu'il rassemble ensuite en un livre.

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PATRICK HAGGARD

VOLITION, AGENCY, RESPONSIBILITY:
COGNITIVE MECHANISMS
OF HUMAN ACTION

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2016